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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1998 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights' and the Convention on the Prevention and

* Professor of Law; President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University
College of Law; President, International Association of Penal Law; President, International
Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences; Former Chairman, Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to Investigate Violations of
International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia; Vice-Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court; Vice-Chairman, Preparatory
Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court; Chairman, Drafting
Committee, Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries for the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprintedin 3
INTERNATIONAL LAW & WORLD ORDER: BASIc DOC MENTS III.A.1 (Burns H. Weston ed., 5 vols.,
1994-).
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Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2 respectively adopted on the tenth and
ninth of December 1948. The year 1998 marks also birth date of the Treaty on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court adopted in Rome on
July 17, 1998. On this occasion, it is important to take stock of international
law's progress, to assess how much its veneer has thickened, and to
determine what needs to be done to make more effective its goals of
prevention and control. Since most of the world's victimization occurs in
violation of international law's proscriptions against war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide, this article will deal with the weaknesses of
the normative framework of these three jus cogens crimes. My purpose is to
eliminate, or at least substantially narrow, the legal loopholes through which
the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are
able, with impunity, to escape accountability for their international crimes
and widespread violations of fundamental human rights.
International humanitarian law is that body of norms that protects
certain categories of persons and property and prohibits attacks against them
during the course of armed conflicts be they of an international or noninternational character. 3 These norms derive from conventional and
customary international law which are respectively referred to as "the Law of
Geneva" (for the conventional law of armed conflicts) and "the Law of The
Hague" (for the customary law of armed conflicts). "The Law of The Hague" is
not, however, exclusively customary law because it is in part treaty law and
the "the Law of Geneva" is also not exclusively treaty law because it includes
customary law. Thus, the traditional distinction between conventional and
customary law is substantially eroded. Additionally, the treaty law that
applies to weapons derives from customary as well as conventional law, and
some of its specific norms have become part of customary law. In sum, in the
last one hundred years, the evolution of the dual sources of international
humanitarian law, namely conventional and customary law, have become so
intertwined and so overlapping that they can be said to be two sides of the
same coin. The nomenclature "the Law of Geneva" and "the Law of The
Hague" is therefore only a useful shorthand label.
In addition to this historic dual-track evolution of the law of armed
conflicts, two additional developments have expanded the general scope of the
term "international humanitarian law," namely, the proscriptions against

2. Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) (entered into force with
respect to the United States Nov. 25, 1989) [hereinafter Genocide Convention], reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 763, and 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW & WORLD ORDER: BASIC DOCUMENTS II.E.3 (Burns H.
Weston ed., 5 vols., 1994-) [hereinafter 2 Weston].
3. See generally THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Leon Friedman ed., 2 vols., 1972);
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER

DOCUMENTS (Dietrich Schindler & Jii Toman eds., 1988); HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN
WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES (1993); and HOWARD S. LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL

ARMED CONFLICT (2 vols., 1986).
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crimes against humanity4 and genocide. 5 The first originated as an outgrowth
of war crimes even though it subsequently evolved into a distinct category of
international crimes; the second, though originally intended to encompass
crimes against humanity, also evolved into a distinct and separate category of
international crimes. The norms contained in these three major international
crimes-war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide-have become
part ofjus cogens.6 Deriving from multiple legal sources, they overlap relative

4. See generally M. CHERIF BAssIouNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW (1992) (2d rev. ed. in print 1998) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY].
5. See, e.g., PIETER N. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE (2 vols., 1959); Matthew Lippman, The
Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3
B.U. INT L L.J. 1 (1984); and Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 2d ed. forthcoming in 1998).
6. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, InternationalCrimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996). The Tadi6 majority opinion dealt with several aspects of
international humanitarian law in an overlapping manner when it held:
The second aspect, determining which individual of the targeted population
qualify as civilians for purposes of crimes against humanity, is not, however,
quite as clear. Common Article 3, the language of which reflects "elementary
considerations of humanity" which are "applicable under customary
international law to any armed conflict," provides that in an armed conflict
"not of an international character" Contracting States are obliged "as a
minimum" to comply with the following: "Persons taking no active part in
the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely ...." Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims in International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) defines
civilians by the exclusion of prisoners of war and armed forces, considering a
person a civilian in case of doubt. However, this definition of civilians
contained in Common Article 3 is not immediately applicable to crimes
against humanity because it is a part of the laws or customs of war and can
only be applied by analogy. The same applies to the definition contained in
Protocol I and the Comnmnentaiy, Geneva Convention IV, on the treatment of
civilians, both of which advocate a broad interpretation of the term "civilian."
They, and particularly Common Article 3, do, however, provide guidance in
answering the most difficult question: specifically, whether acts taken
against an individual who cannot be considered a traditional "noncombatant" because he is actively involved in the conduct of hostilities by
membership in some form of resistance group can nevertheless constitute
crimes against humanity if they are committed in the furtherance or as part
of an attack directed against a civilian population.
Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid, (IT-94-I-T), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908 at 939-940 (1997) (citations
and footnotes omitted). It is unclear, in the understanding of the majority, what are the legal
boundaries between the customary law of armed conflicts applicable to conflicts of a noninternational character and, respectively, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
See infra Appendix III. See also Protocol II, infra note 86, infra Appendix III, reprinted in 2
II.B.11 Weston, supra note 2. See also Theodor Meron, InternationalCriminalizationof Internal
Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1995).
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to their context, content, purpose, scope, application, perpetrators, and
7
protected interests.
These norms also contain certain ambiguities and gaps, the existence of
which is due essentially to two factors. The first is the haphazard evolution of
international criminal law. 8 The second is that governments, which control
the international legislative processes, are not, for a variety of reasons,
though mostly for political reasons, desirous of eliminating the overlaps,
closing the gaps, and removing the ambiguities 9-not a surprising fact given
that two of the three categories of crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide occur with deliberate state action or policy, and that governments
are not particularly inclined to criminalize the conduct of their high
officials:10 War crimes can also be a product of state action or policy, but
frequently are committed by individual combatants acting on their own,
which probably explains why there is less reluctance to criminalize this type
of individual criminal conduct. 11

7. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in the Tadie
majority opinion, erroneously applied the standards of "state responsibility" reflected in the
I.C.J.'s Nicaragua v. U.S. to the determination of whether a conflict is of an international or
non-international character. See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 331-47 (June 27). The majority also did
not contribute to clarity when it very broadly concluded that:
International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed
conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general
conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful
settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law
continues in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of
internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether
or not actual combat takes place there.
Prosecutor v. Du~ko Tadid, (IT-94-1-T), May 7, 1997, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 939-940 (1997)
(citations and footnotes omitted). See also Theodor Meron, Classification of Armed Conflict in
the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua'sFallout,92 AM. J. INT'L L. 236 (1998).
8. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND THEIR PENAL
PROVISIONS 21-31 (1997), [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS].
9. This is evidenced by the position of different governments in the Preparatory Committee on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. See Report of the PreparatoiyCommittee
on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.1832Add.1 (1998),
see infra Appendix I, at Vol. II pp. 56-69.
10. One reason will be the fact that international crimes involving state action or policy
potentially reach all the way to the top of the military and civilian hierarchy. See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The -Need to Establish a
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 11 (1997), [hereinafter
Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda], describing the history of international criminal
investigatory bodies and international criminal tribunals. With respect to the limits of command
responsibility see INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supranote 5, at 21-74.
11. The regulation of armed conflicts benefits from the fact that regular armies are usually well
disciplined and have a tight command structure that controls discipline and the observance of
the laws of armed conflicts. Furthermore, regular armies have a shared interest in the
observance of the laws of armed conflicts because violations by one side to a conflict can result

Fall 1998]

NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OFIINTERNATIONAL HUMANiTARIAN LAW

203

Crimes against humanity and genocide are essentially crimes of state, as
are sometimes war crimes, because they need the substantial involvement of
state organs, including the army, police, paramilitary groups, and the state's
bureaucracy. 12 These crimes generate significant victimization and must be
strenuously deterred. Nevertheless, governments are reluctant to remove the
ambiguities in the relevant normative provisions applicable to crimes against
humanity and genocide, and to fill the existing gaps in these proscriptions.13
The individual criminal responsibility of soldiers and others in the lower
echelons of state power is much more easily accepted by governments than
that of political leaders and senior government officials and, as well, those in
the governmental bureaucracy who carry out, execute, and facilitate the
policies and practices of crimes against humanity, genocide, and even war
crimes. Indeed, the articulation of relevant international norms effectively
shields them from criminal responsibility; existing international norms of
criminal responsibility relative to crimes against humanity, crimes of
genocide, and even war crimes, are too ambiguous to reach effectively into
this category of violators. This renders their prosecution virtually impossible.
Since World War II, there have been an estimated 250 conflicts of an
international, non-international, and purely internal legal character. The
estimates of the resulting casualties reach as high as 170 million. 14 Most of
in actions by the other side, even though reprisals are limited. See FRITS KALSHOVEN,
BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (1971). Conversely, however, when genocide or crimes against
humanity occur, the same constraints that exist in armies arising out of the considerations
stated above, are not usually present in the course of genocide and crimes against humanity.
12. Genocide and crimes against humanity, as discussed below, are however also applicable to
non-state actors. The problem of non-state actors, acting by themselves or in concert with state
actors nevertheless remains, as the definitions of genocide and crimes against humanity do not
specifically contemplate non-state actors, particularly when there is no concert of action with
state actors. By implication, however, it should be clear that genocide and crimes against
humanity apply to non-state actors as well.
13. The most recent example of such governmental reluctance to remove ambiguities and fill
gaps is that of the ICC Diplomatic Conference in Rome, June 15-July 17, 1998, whose statute
has not removed the overlaps, gaps, and ambiguities with respect to genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/9 (1998), infra Appendix I, at art. 7, Appendix II, at art. 6, Appendix VI at art. 8
[hereinafter ICC Statute].
14. This estimate is by some accounts for all conflicts since World War I, and by others for all
victimization since World War II. See Jennifer L. Balint, An Empirical Study of Conflict,
Conflict Victimization and Legal Redress, 14 NOUVELLES ETUDES PtNALES 101 (Christopher C.
Joyner, Special Ed. & M. Cherif Bassiouni, General Ed., 1998); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching
for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9
(1996); See, e.g., R.J. RUMMEL, STATISTICS OF DEMOCIDE, GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER SINCE
1900 (1997); Margareta Sollenberg & Peter Wallesteen, Major Armed Conflicts in 1995, in SIPRI
YEARBOOK 1996 (1996). There were two studies reported in the PIOOM Newsletter and Progress
Report in 1994 and 1995: A.J. Jongman & A.P. Schmid, Contemporay C6nflicts: A Global
Survey of High and Lower Intensity Conflicts and Serious Disputes, 7 PIOOM NEWSLETTER AND
PROGRESS REPORT 14 (Winter, 1995) and Study, 6 PIOOM NEWSLETTER AND PROGRESS REPORT
17 (1994). See also Alex P. Schmid, Early Warning of Violent Conflicts: Causal Approaches, in
Violent Crinte & Conflicts 47 (ISPAC 1997); "PIOOM World Conflict and Human Rights Map
1998" at (last visitied Oct. 30, 1998) <http://www.fsw.leiden.univ.nl>.
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that victimization occurred at the hands of tyrannical regimes and by nonstate actors during internal conflicts. This tragic new dimension in world
victimization requires a reexamination of international humanitarian law to
make it unambiguously applicable to non-state actors, and to reconcile their
overlapping application, fill in their gaps, and clarify their ambiguities so as
to render their enforcement sufficiently effective to prevent, deter, and
punish the perpetrators of such crimes. This article discusses these questions.

II. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Crimes against humanity originated after World War 115 in the concept of
"crimes against the laws of humanity," a term found in the Preamble to the
16
i907 Hague Convention.
Until a more complete code of laws of war has been issued,
the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare
that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by
them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations,
as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of
17
the public conscience.
After the war, in 1919, the Allies established a Commission to investigate war
crimes'5 which thereafter found that the killing of Armenians by the Turks
around 191519 constituted "crimes against the laws of humanity." The United
States and Japan strongly objected to the concept and insisted on having
their dissenting positions reflected in the Report. 20 In 1923, after the failure
of ratification of the 1919 Treaty of S~vres, 21 which required that the Turkish
15. BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4.
16. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land [Second Hague, IV], Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) (entered into force with
respect to the United States Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention], reprinted in 2
Weston, supranote 2, at II.B.1.
17. Id., Preamble
18. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29, 1919, 14 AM. J.
INTL L. 95 (1920).
19. VAHAKN N. DADRIAN, THE HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: ETHNIC CONFLICT FROM
THE BALKANS TO ANATOLIA TO THE CAUCASUS (1985).

20. See Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representatives of the United States to
the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, Annex II, April 4, 1919, reprinted in 14 AM. J.
INT'L L. 127, 144-51 (1920); Reservation by the JapaneseDelegation, Annex III, April 4, 1919,
reprintedin 14 AM. J. INT L L. 151 (1920).
21. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, Aug. 10, 1920 (Treaty of S~vres),
reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (Supp. 1921).
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government turn over to the Allies those responsible for such crimes, the
Treaty of Lausanne 22 excluded such a provision and a protocol was attached,
giving amnesty to the Turks who had committed the crime irrespective of
whether they acted as state actors or non-state actors. 23 By 1942, the Allies
realized that they would have to revisit that crime, 24 and in 1945 the London
Charter provided, in Article 6(c), for the prosecution of those who committed
"crimes against humanity"25:
Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian populations, before or during
the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
But that article linked Article 6(c) crimes to "crimes against peace" (the
initiation and conduct of war) as defined in Article 6(a) and to "war crimes" as
defined in Article 6(b). This meant that all "crimes against humanity"
committed before the initiation of the war, between 1932 and 1939, were not
26
prosecutable.
The war-connecting link was removed in a 1950 Report of the
International Law Commission (ILC).27 The question that remained, however,

22. Treaty with Turkey and Other Instruments Signed at Lausanne July 24, 1923 Final Act,
reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (Supp. 1925).
23. JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING
WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1982).
24. THE PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LONDON INTERNATIONAL
ASSEMBLY (Report of Commission I) (1944).
25. Agreement by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the
French Republic, and the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis and the Charter
of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 3
Bevans 1238, entered into force Aug. 8, 1945, [hereinafter London Charter], reprinted in 2
Weston, supra note 2, at II.E.1. See also Special Prosecution Establishing an International
Military Tribunal for the Far East and Charter of the International Military for the Far East,
Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 3, 4 Bevans 20 [hereinafter IMTFE], reprinted in 2 Weston,
supra note 2, at II.E.2. Article 5(c) is similar to Article 6(c) of the London Charter, as is Article
II(c) of Control Council No. 10, though it removes the war connecting requirement.
26. LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS: 1933-1945 (1975).
27. See Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316
(1950), 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 126, infra Appendix I [hereinafter 1950 ILC Report], reprinted in 2
Weston, supra note 2, at II.E.4.
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was the legally binding effect of such a report. 28 On its face, a report of the
ILC has no binding effect, unless it is deemed to be the embodiment of
customary international law, in which case the ILC report can be seen as the
progressive codification of customary international law and therefore binding
as to its content. However, the practice of states remains an important
element in addition to the element of opino juris to establish customary
international law, 29 and this practice seems to be somewhat wanting because
30
there are few states that have prosecuted persons for such crimes.
Moreover, no convention on crimes against humanity has been developed
since 1945,31 even though many other conventions on various international
crimes have been adopted since that time. 32 There is no rational explanation
for this gap other than the lack of political will by governments.
The next opportunity to reaffirm the London Charter's "crimes against
humanity" arose in 1993 when the Security Council adopted the Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 33 In
34
this statute, however, the connection to an armed conflict was preserved
28. Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Development and Future Prospects, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 83 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
29. See Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1
(1974-75); ANTHONYA. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971).
30. The states that have done so are Canada, France, and Israel.
31. See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supranote 4.
32. BASSiOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS, supra note 8.
33. See Statute of the International Tribunal (for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia)
May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
(1993) infra Appendix I [hereinafter ICTY Statute], reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, and 2 Weston,
supra note 2, at II.E.10.
34. Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadi6, (IT-94-I-T), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908 (1997). See also ICTY
Statute in Appendix I, at Article 5. Concerning the war-connecting link, the Tadi6 decision
stated:
Article 5 of the Statute, addressing crimes against humanity, grants the
International Tribunal jurisdiction over the enumerated acts "when
committed in armed conflict." The requirement of an armed conflict is
similar to that of Article 6(c) of the Niirnberg Charter which limited the
Niirnberg Tribunal's jurisdiction to crimes against humanity committed
"before or during the war," although in the case of the NiArnberg Tribunal
jurisdiction was further limited by requiring that crimes against humanity
be committed "in execution of or in connection with" war crimes or crimes
against peace. Despite this precedent, the inclusion of the requirement of an
armed conflict deviates from the development of the doctrine after the
Niirnberg Charter, beginning with Control Council Law No. 10, which no
longer links the concept of crimes against humanity with an armed conflict.
As the Secretary-General stated: "Crimes against humanity are aimed at
any civilian population and are prohibited regardless of whether they are
committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in character." In
the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda the requirement of an
armed conflict is omitted, requiring only that acts be committed as part of an
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with Article 5 requiring that "crimes against humanity" take place in the
attack against a civilian population. The Appeals Chamber has stated that,
by incorporating the requirement of an armed conflict, "the Security Council
may have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under
customary international law," having stated earlier that "[s]ince customary
international law no longer requires any nexus between crimes against
humanity and armed conflict ... Article 5 was intended to reintroduce this
nexus for the purposes of this Tribunal." Accordingly, its existence must be
proved, as well as the link between the act or omission charged and the
armed conflict.
The Appeals Chamber, as discussed in greater detail in Section VI.A of this
Opinion and Judgment, stated that "an armed conflict exists whenever there
is resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups within a State." Consequently, this is the test which the Trial
Chamber has applied and it has concluded that the evidence establishes the
existence of an armed conflict.
The next issue which must be addressed is the required nexus between the
act or omission and the armed conflict. The Prosecution argues that to
establish the nexus for a violation of Article 5 it is sufficient to demonstrate
that the crimes were committed at some point in the course or duration of an
armed conflict, even if such crimes were not committed in direct relation to
or as part of the conduct of hostilities, occupation, or other integral aspects of
the armed conflict. In contrast the Defence argues that the act must be
committed "in" armed conflict.
The Statute does not elaborate on the required link between the act and the
armed conflict. Nor, for that matter, does the Appeals Chamber Decision,
although it contains several statements that are relevant in this regard.
First is the finding, noted above, that the Statute is more restrictive than
custom in that "customary international law no longer requires any nexus
between crimes against humanity and armed conflict." Accordingly, it is
necessary to determine the degree of nexus which is imported by the Statute
by its inclusion of the requirement of an armed conflict. This, then, is a
question of statutory interpretation.
The Appeals Chamber Decision is relevant to this question of statutory
interpretation. In addressing Article 3 the Appeals Chamber noted that
where interpretative declarations are made by Security Council members
and are not contested by other delegations "they can be regarded as
providing an authoritative interpretation" of the relevant provisions of the
Statute. Importantly, several permanent members of the Security Council
commented that they interpret "when committed in armed conflict" in
Article 5 of the Statute to mean "during a period of armed conflict." These
statements were not challenged and can thus, in line with the Appeals
Chamber Decision, be considered authoritative interpretations of this
portion of Article 5.
The Appeals Chamber, in dismissing the Defense argument that the concept
of armed conflict covers only the precise time and place of actual hostilities,
said: "It is sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely related to the
hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties
to the conflict." Thus it is not necessary that the acts occur in the heat of
battle.
Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid, (IT-94-1-T), reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 908, 913 (1997) (citations
and footnotes omitted).
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context of "an armed conflict" of an international or internal character. The
difference between the war-connecting link of the London Charter's Article
6(c) and the ICTY's Article 5 is the addition in Article 5 of a conflict of an
internal character.
In 1994, however, when the same Security Council adopted the Statute
for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),35 it did not
include any war-connection whatsoever. 36 Why the change? One explanation
is that the ICTY's formulators sought to preserve the London Charter's
requirement, though expanding it to internal conflicts, to offset arguments
that Article 5 of the ICTY departed from existing customary law. 37 Since
there was no convention on crimes against humanity, that category of crimes
had to be deemed as falling within customary law. 38 But with respect to the
ICTR, the Government of Rwanda was not expected to challenge the absence
of such a requirement.3 9 To have included such a war-connecting requirement
in the ICTR statute would have meant that prosecutions for such crimes
40
would have been impossible because that conflict was purely internal.

35. See Resolution 955 (1994) Establishing the International Tribunal For Rwanda, Nov. 8,
1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) infra
Appendix I [hereinafter ICTR Statute], reprintedin 33 I.L.M. 1598, and 2 Weston, supra note 2,
at II.E.12.
36. See id. at art. 3.
37. See, e.g., Ch. 2, "Establishment of the Tribunal and Legislative History" of M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA 199-235 (1996). The Appeal Chamber in the Tadie case noted that "it is by now a
settled Rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a
connection to international armed conflict. Indeed ... customary international law may not
require a connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all." Decision in
Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid, (IT-94-1-AR72), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, at 72 (1996). Further, the
Tadiedecision stated:
If customary international law is determinative of what type of conflict is
required in order to constitute a crime against humanity, the prohibition
against crimes against humanity is necessarily part of customary
international law. As such, the commission of crimes against humanity
violates customary international law, of which Article 5 of the Statute is, for
the most part, reflective. As stated by the Appeals Chamber: "There is no
question ... that the definition of crimes against humanity adopted by the
Security Council in Article 5 comports with the principle of nullum crinen
sine lege."
Id. at 937. The Appeal Chamber in the Nikoli6 case noted that a crime against humanity must
be shown to have been committed in the course of an armed conflict. Nikolid Rule 61 Hearing,
(IT-95-2-R61).
38. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 6.
39. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 10, at 46-49.
40. For an insight into the establishment of the ICTR, see VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (2 vols. 1998).
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An examination of the contents of crimes against humanity as defined in
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter reveals that it covers the following
acts: "murder, extermination, enslavement, imprisonment, deportation or
other inhumane acts," and "persecution."41 The ICTY and ICTR added "rape"
for specificity. 42 However, the ICTR also added the restrictive requirement

not present in the ICTY; that the acts constituting the crime must be the
result of "widespread or systematic" practices. 43 Furthermore, some of the
terms used in the London Charter's Article 6(c), the ICTY's Article 5, and the
ICTR's Article 3 may be deemed to lack sufficient specificity to satisfy the
"principles of legality" required in the world's major legal systems.44 For
example, "other inhumane acts" can be deemed vague, "murder" overlaps
with "extermination," and "imprisonment" and "deportation" can be lawful. Of
course, careful judicial interpretation can avoid such vagueness and
ambiguity, but that presupposes the existence of a judicial process that can
develop a clear and precise jurisprudence, and in that respect much is
expected from the ICTY and ICTR.
Another issue concerning "crimes against humanity" is whether it is
essentially a category of mass victimization crimes, which is predicated on
the existence of state-action or state-policy, or whether it is but a catch-all
category for mass crimes even when committed by non-state actors. 45 The
formulation of Article 6(c) raises that issue relative to whether "persecution"
is a required policy element or simply another genre of the specific crimes
listed in Article 6(c), or indeed, whether it is both a specific type of prohibited
46
act as well as a policy element applicable to state and non-state actors alike.
In this writer's judgment, "crimes against humanity" as set forth in Article
6(c) is no mere catch-all category for mass victimization, but rather a category
of international crimes, distinguishable from other forms of mass
victimization by the jurisdictional policy element of a "state action or policy."
But when the ICTR's Article 3 was made to qualify Article 6(c)'s policy of
persecution by the addition of the terms "widespread or systematic," 47 the
drafters, while doubtless seeking to tailor the definition of "crimes against
humanity" to the Rwandan conflict, brought about a progressive
41. See London Charter, supranote 25, at art. 6(c).
42. See ICTY Statute art. 5(g) infra Appendix I; ICTR Statute art. 3(g) infra Appendix I.
43. See ICTR Statute infra Appendix I, at art. 3. It is interesting to note that Article 5 of the
ICTY does not refer to the words "widespread or systematic" contained in Article 3 of the ICTR.
Yet, in the Tadi5 opinion the Trial Chamber referred to the words "widespread or systematic"
using the disjunctive. See generallyMICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE (1997).
44. See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at Ch. 4 "The Principles of
Legality."
45. See id. at Ch. 5.
46. See id. See also Roger S. Clark, Crimes Against Humanity at Nuremberg, in THE
NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (George Ginsburgs & Vladimir N. Kudriavtsev
eds., 1990); Egon Schwelb, CrimesAgainst Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1946).
47. ICTR Statute, infra Appendix I, at art. 3 (emphasis added).
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development. This is evidenced in the disjunctive "or" as opposed to the
conjunctive "and." If the mass victimization can be only "widespread" and not
also "systematic," then it can be the spontaneous consequence of a given
conflict 48 and not necessarily a reflection of "state action or policy."
The statute of the ICC adopted in Rome on July 17, 1998, follows the
ICTR's precedent in that it states in its Article 7 that "[flor the purpose of this
statute, 'crimes against humanity' means any of the following acts when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population with knowledge of the attack.... ."49 At the same time, the
ICC Statute's Article 7(h) makes "persecution" specifically prohibited
conduct; 50 and while it is one of the forms of carrying out an "attack directed
against any civilian population," the persecution of a group of persons is by
its very nature possible only as a consequence of state action or policy carried
out by state actors or non-state actors, or the product of policy carried out by
non-state actors. In fact, most of the specific crimes listed within the meaning
of this definition can occur only as a result of state action or policy carried out
by state actors or non-state actors: "(b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d)
51
deportation or forcible transfer of population; ...(j) the crime of Apartheid."
The other specifically listed crimes presumably can be committed by
individuals without the existence of state action or policy. But clearly if such
crimes are directed against a "civilian population," they are necessarily the
product of state action or policy carried out by state actors or the product of
policy of non-state actors. These specific crimes are:
(a) murder; . . .(e) imprisonment or other severe deprivation
of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law; (f) torture; (g) rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;...
(i) enforced disappearance of persons; ...(k) other inhumane
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great

48. For sure the terms "widespread or systematic" as used in Article 3 of the ICTR cannot be
interpreted as a characteristic of the specific crimes listed inthe definition because, for example,
there can be no particular crime called "widespread extermination."
49. ICC Statute, infra Appendix I, at art. 7 (emphasis added).
50. Article 7 states:
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, social,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court....
Id.
51. Id.
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suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
52
health.
Thus, the element of state policy for state actors and that of policy for nonstate actors is dominant throughout this latest definition of "crimes against
humanity."
The element of state action or policy is not the only distinguishing
international jurisdictional characteristic of crimes against humanity; 53 it
carries with it also certain implications concerning the criminal responsibility
of a state's agents who contribute to the overall execution of the state's plan
or policy. Thus, if it is established that a state has developed a policy, or
carried out a plan, or engaged in acts whose outcomes include the crimes
contained in the definition of crimes against humanity, then those persons in
the bureaucratic apparatus who brought about, or contributed to, that result
could be charged with complicity to commit crimes against humanity. Further
those who intended to carry out the policy could be charged with the
54
commission of that crime, or at least, with complicity'to commit that crime.
The responsibility of state agents arises in this case irrespective of whether
their conduct was lawful under national law. However, it is important to note
that the policy element, whether developed or carried out by state actors or
non-state actors, is the jurisdictional element that makes "crimes against
humanity" a category of international crimes and that distinguishes it from
other forms of mass victimization which otherwise are within national
criminal jurisdiction.
Between the Nuremberg formulation of Article 6(c) in 1945 and the
ICTR's formulation of Article 3 in 1994, "crimes against humanity" have
shifted from a category of crimes applicable only to situations involving state
policy or action to situations involving non-state actors. This shift has been
evidenced in the ICTR and ICC Statutes which provide the requirements of
"widespread or systematic" and "attack against any civilian population." The
combination of the two requirements makes the crime applicable to both state
and non-state actors; and also applicable in time of peace and war, without
any connecting link to the initiation or conduct of war or to war crimes.
Other than these two formulations, "crimes against humanity" never
have been the subject of a specialized international convention, thus leaving
some doubt as to some of the specific contents of that category of

52. Id.
53. For example, genocide requires a specific "intent to eliminate in whole or in part," while war
crimes, no matter how widespread or systematic or both, do not require any element of state
action or policy in connection with the commission of these crimes.
54. This was the case with Touvier and Papon cases in France. See generally sources cited infra
notes 137, 138, and 139. See also SORJ CHALANDON & PAscALE NIVELLE, CRIMES CONTRA
L'HUMANIT: BARBIE, TOUVIER, BOUSQUET, PAPON (1998).
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international crimes and as to their applicability to non-state actors. 55 This is
evident in the eleven international instruments that have been elaborated
between 1907 and 1998 and that define, in different though similar ways,
"crimes against humanity." Thus, "crimes against humanity" remain part of
customary law, with a mixed baggage of certainty as to some of its elements,
and uncertainty as to others and to their applicability to non-state actors.
A textual comparison of these formulations, which are contained in
Appendix I, evidences the slight differences between them. It also evidences
the overlap that exists between genocide and war crimes relative to the
protected targets and prohibited conduct.

III. GENOCIDE
In defining protected groups the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, specifies only three, namely: national,
ethnic, and religious groups. This enumeration excludes political and social
groups, 56 an omission that was no accident. The Convention was elaborated in
1948, and at that time the USSR was not desirous of having political and
social groups included in those being given protection because Stalin and his
regime already had begun their purges which targeted these very groups. 5
As a consequence of this omission, the killing of an estimated one million
persons in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1985, almost 40
percent of the population, can be argued to have not constituted genocide
because the perpetrators and victims were of the same ethnic group and
because the targeted victim group was a political group which is not covered
by the convention. 58
This gap in the Genocide Convention is well known, but at no time since
1948 was there any effort to fill it. In fact, three opportunities were never

55. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity':"The Need for a Specialized
Convention, 31, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457 (1994). See also BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, supra note 4, at Ch. 7.
56. See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) (entered into force with respect to the
United States Nov. 25, 1989) infra Appendix II [hereinafter Genocide Convention], reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 763, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.E.3. See also The Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 5.
57. See, e.g., ROBERT CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: STALIN'S PURGE OF THE THIRTIES (1973).
See also CHALANDON & NIVELLE, supra note 54.

58.

See generally, JASON S.

ABRAMS

& STEVE R. RATNER,

STRIVING FOR JUSTICE:

ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE CRIMES OF THE KHMER ROUGE (1995); DAVID P. CHANDLER ET AL., POL
POT PLANS THE FUTURE: CONFIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP DOCUMENTS FROM DEMOCRATIC

KAMPUCHEA (1988); GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY IN CAMBODIA (Ben Kiernan ed. 1993). See also
CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS (Samuel Totten et al. eds.,

1997).
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seized. The Statutes of the ICTY59 in 1993 and the ICTR 60 in 1994 were
adopted with the same formulation as Article II of the Genocide Convention.
Later, in connection with the elaboration of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, the Preparatory Committee failed to support any changes to
61
Article II of the Genocide Convention.
As stated, the Genocide Convention protects three groups, national,
ethnic, and religious. 62 It also specifies that there must be a specific "intent to
destroy [the protected group] in whole or in part."63 This requirement makes
it appear that the criminal responsibility befalls essentially those who plan,
initiate, or carry out the policy that is specifically intended to produce the
result of destroying the protected group "in whole or in part," and leaves open
the questions of the responsibility of those in the lower echelons of the
execution of such a policy and the legal standards required to prove it.64 The
requirement of specific intent in the criminal laws of most legal systems is
more difficult to prove than that of general intent. General intent can be
proven inferentially by the legal standard of what the ordinary reasonable
person would have known under existing circumstances. 65 This difficulty is
especially true of lower echelons of executors where typically there exists no
"paper trail." But to prove specific intent by higher echelons may also be
arduous if there is no paper trail. The reason is that the Genocide Convention
was drafted with the Nazi experience in mind; the Germans, who were
meticulous in everything, left behind a detailed paper trail.66 But this
situation never has been repeated. In the Yugoslav 67 and Rwandan 68 conflicts,
for example, a paper trail, if it exists, has yet to be found, and it may never be

59. See IJTY Statute, infra Appendix II, at art. 4.
60. See ICTR Statute, infra Appendix II, at art. 2.
61. See ICC Statute, infra Appendix II, at art. 6.
62. See Genocide Convention, infra Appendix II, at art. II.
63. Id.
64. See generally BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at Ch. 8 "Elements of
Criminal Responsibility."
65. That standard exists in the criminal laws in those legal systems influenced by the RomanistCivilist Germanic legal traditions, as well as those legal systems influenced by the Common
Law tradition.
66. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 57 (1992).
67. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International HumanitarianLaw in the
Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 279-340 (1994). See also Final Report of the Commission of
Experts Established Pursuantto Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994).
68. See generally G2RARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF GENOCIDE (1995). See also
MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 40; Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction:
The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349 (1997).
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made public by those who have the information. 69 The same is true of other
conflicts such as Cambodia. 70 There are, moreover, conflicts where a paper
71
trail exists but has not been made public.
In addition to the issue of specific genocidal intent, which is fraught with
evidentiary difficulties, there is the question of whether the protected group
can be identified differently. For example, can it be based on gender, or
limited to a group in a given area? The Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), which investigated
violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia,
concluded that these two questions can be answered in the positive.7 2 In the
French trial of Papon who was convicted on April 2, 1998 of complicity for
"crimes against humanity" as defined in French criminal law, 73 the central
issue, where "genocide" was frequently referred to though the charge was
only "crimes against humanity," was how to prove complicity in these types of
crimes by agents of the state. When a person charged is a bureaucrat
operating in a large bureaucracy,7 4 it is so far unclear how individual criminal
responsibility can be established for such a person where no specific criminal
act is accomplished, but whose administrative function aids in the ultimate

69. It is also believed that in the Yugoslav conflict the U.S. has satellite and other airreconnaissance pictures and probably recorded air-waves and telephone communications that
would establish certain facts constituting any one of the three major crimes mentioned, but for
political reasons has elected not to make them available to the ICTY Prosecutor.
70. See sources cited supra note 58, particularly ABRAMS & RATNER.
71. In the Arabian Gulf the U.S. has amassed substantial documentation of war crimes
committed by the Iraqi regime against Kuwaiti, Iraqi Kurds and Shia, and Iranians, but the
documentation has not yet made it public. See Indictment and Prosecutionof Saddam Hussein,
S. Con. Res. 78, 105th Cong. (March 13, 1998). See also 144 CONG. REC. Nos. 12-13 (daily ed.
Feb. 23, 1998) (Senate Resolution 179, Relating to the Indictment and Prosecution of Saddam
Hussein for War Crimes and Other Crimes Against Humanity). See also War Crimes: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on InternationalLaw, Immigration, and Refugees of the Committee on
the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 13, 1991); International
Criminal Court, SENATE REP. No. 103-71 (1993); Senate J. Res. 93, 103d Cong. (1993); Senate J.
Res. 32, 103d Cong. (1993).
72. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuantto Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/1994/674 (1994); Annexes to
the Final Report, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (1994); Bassiouni, supra
note 67.
73. Craig R. Whitney, Vichy Official Found Guilty of Helping Deport Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
1998, at AS.
74. See generally Jacques Francillon, Crimes de guerre, Crimes contre l'humanit6, JURISCLASSEUR, DROIT INTL, FASCICULE 410 (1993); Leila Sadat Wexler, National Prosecutions for
InternationalCrimes: The French Experience, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. forthcoming in 1998) [hereinafter 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW]; Leila
Sadat Wexler, Prosecutions for Crimes Against Humanity in French Municipal Law:
InternationalImplications, in ASIL PROCEEDINGS 270-76 (1997).
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conduct. 75 These questions remain unanswered by the norms applicable both
to "genocide" and to "crimes against humanity."
Lastly, a question arises as to "genocide," and that is the nature and size
of the "group" targeted for elimination "in whole or in part." Is it the entire
group as it exists in the world, or a smaller portion of that group which is
identified and targeted by the perpetrators? Could it be, for example, that
portion of the group that inhabits a certain area, or a given town, or a
segment of that group such as the intellectuals or the women in that group?
That was the issue that faced the Commission of Experts 76 in determining
whether "ethnic cleansing" 77 could be deemed a form of genocide. Similarly,
the issue arose with respect to the policy of systematic rape of the women of a
78
certain identifiable group.
The Genocide Convention leaves these questions unanswered, but it
would be valid to consider the Genocide Convention as susceptible of
progressive interpretation in light of the new techniques that nefarious
planners devise to achieve their evil goals. The Genocide Convention justifies
79
an evolving interpretation that fulfills its goals and purposes.
Since 1948, "genocide," as defined in the Genocide Convention,8 0 has been
embodied in three international instruments, to wit, the statutes of the
ICTY,81 ICTR,82 and the Statute of the International Criminal Court,8 3 and
the incorporation of Article II of the Genocide Convention into these three
instruments has been without change.8 4 Accordingly, none of the problems
evident since 1948 have been addressed to date.

75. See, e.g., Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 463 (1995).
76. See Final Report, supra note 72.
77. Id.
78. Id. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Investigating Serious Violations of International
HumanitarianLaw in the Former Yugoslavia (DePaul University, Occasional paper); Meron,
supra note 6. See also the indictment of Karadzid and Mladid, in which the judge referred to
"ethnic cleansing" as a form of genocide, (IT-95-18-I).

79. See The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
5.
80. See Genocide Convention, infra Appendix II, at art. II.
81. See ICTY Statute, infra Appendix II, at art. 4.
82. See ICTR Statute, infra Appendix II, at art. 2.
83. ICC Statute, infra Appendix II, at art. 2.
84. See Appendix II.
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IV. WAR CRIMES
The regulation of armed conflicts has two sources: (1) conventional law,
also referred to as the "Law of Geneva," consisting of the four Geneva
conventions of 194985 plus two additional protocols of 197786 relating to
"conflicts of an international character" and to "conflicts of a noninternational character"; and (2) customary law, also referred to as the "Law
87
of The Hague," which refers to the customary practices of states.
As stated above, however, the "Law of The Hague" is not exclusively
customary law because it is in part treaty law and the "Law of Geneva" is also
not exclusively treaty law because it incorporates customary law. Thus, the
traditional distinction between conventional and customary law is
substantially eroded. Additionally, the treaty law that applies to weapons
derives from both customary and conventional law, and that body of treaty
law, as well as some of its specific norms, has become part of customary law.
Customary law, however, is binding only on the states that share in the
custom and that express their will to be bound by it unless it becomes a
general custom that is binding on all states. Consequently, states that do not
follow the custom, unless it is a general custom, are not bound by it as a legal
obligation. Nevertheless, a custom can rise to such a level of general
85. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 4 Bevans 853, (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950), (entered into force with respect to the United States Feb. 2, 1956), reprinted
in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.11; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) (entered into force with respect to the
United States Feb. 2, 1956) reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.12; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 47
AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (1953) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) (entered into force with respect to
the United States Feb. 2, 1956), reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.13; 53 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) (entered
into force with respect to the United States Feb. 2, 1956), reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at
II.B.14.
86. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 [hereinafter 1977 Protocol
I], opened for signatureat Berne, Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A132/144 (1977) Annex I (entered into
force Dec. 7, 1978), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.20; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter 1977 Protocol II], Dec. 12, 1977, U.N.
Doc. A/32/144 (1977) Annex II (entered into force Dec. 17, 1978), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391,
and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.21.
87. Customary international law consists of the practice of states confirmed by their intention to
be legally bound by the practice. See Akehurst, supra note 29; Hiram E. Chodosh, An
InterpretiveTheoiy of InternationalLaw: The Distinction Between Treaty and Customaly Law,
28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 973 (1995); D'AMATO, supra note 29; Jordan J. Paust, Customary
InternationalLaw: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 59, 61 (1990); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1996). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal
Common Law: A Critiqueof the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
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acceptance that it may become binding even on those states that do not share
in the custom or that may express their will not to be bound by it. This
applies to those general customs that rise to a higher level of acceptance and
which reflect a universal sense of opprobrium, namely jus cogens or a
peremptory norm of international law. 88 Among the international crimes that
fall within this category are: aggression, genocide, "crimes against humanity,"
war crimes, slavery and slave-related practices, torture, and piracy. In time,
other international crimes 89 may rise to that level and be deemed Jus cogens
crimes.
In 1899 and then again in 1907, the customary law of armed conflicts was
"codified" in the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land.90 But that codification was applicable only to states and only when a
conflict was between states-in other words, a "conflict of an international
character," as that term was developed subsequently in the 1949 Geneva
conventions. Contrary to general belief, the 1907 Hague Convention did not
establish the principle of individual criminal responsibility for the enunciated
violations, but only the principle of compensation, which was incumbent upon
the violating state. It was only in time, starting with the aftermath of World
War I, but more particularly in the aftermath of World War II, that the
principles of individual criminal responsibility, and of command
responsibility under international law, were made part of customary law. 91
In addition to this original customary law of armed conflicts, a number of
international instruments have been executed. Most of these cover the use or
prohibition of use of certain weapons in time of war, the prohibition of certain
weapons at all times, and the prohibition of emplacement of weapons in
certain places at any time; 92 as well as the protection from destruction and
88. See Bassiouni, supra note 6, and the authorities cited therein.
89. At present there are 25 categories of international crimes. They are: (1) aggression; (2)
genocide; (3) crimes against humanity; (4) war crimes; (5) crimes against United Nations and
associated personnel; (6) unlawful possession or use or emplacement of weapons; (7) theft of
nuclear materials; (8) mercenarism; (9) apartheid; (10) slavery and slave-related practices; (11)
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; (12) unlawful human
experimentation; (13) piracy; (14) aircraft hijacking and unlawful acts against international air
safety; (15) unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation and the safety of platforms
on the high seas; (16) threat and use of force against internationally protected persons; (17)
taking of civilian hostages; (18) unlawful use of the mail; (19) unlawful traffic in drugs and
related drug offenses; (20) destruction and/or theft of national treasures; (21) unlawful acts
against certain internationally protected elements of the environment; (22) international traffic
in obscene materials; (23) falsification and counterfeiting; (24) unlawful interference with
submarine cables; and, (25) bribery of foreign public officials. These crimes are reflected in 323
international instruments elaborated between 1815-1997. See BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS,
supra note 8.
90. See Hague Convention, Appendix III, reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2 at II.B.1.
91. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 10.
92. There are 35 treaties on the control of weapons. See BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS, supra

note 8.
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1. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight [St. Petersburg Declaration], Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser.
1) 474 (entered into force Dec. 11, 1868), reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.8; 2.
Declaration Concerning the Prohibition, for the Term of Five Years, of the Launching of
Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons or Other New Methods of a Similar Nature [First
Hague, IV, 1], July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 994 (entered
into force Sept. 4, 1900) (entered into force with respect to the United States Sept. 4, 1900); 3.
Declaration Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles Diffusing Asphyxiating Gases
[First Hague, IV, 2], July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 998 (entered into force
Sept. 4, 1900), reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.34; 4. Declaration Concerning the
Prohibition of the Use of Expanding Bullets [First Hague, IV, 3], July 29, 1899, 26 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 1002, (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900), reprinted in 2 Weston, supra
note 2, at II.C.9; 5. Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land [Second Hague, V], Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 205 Consol. T.S. 299, 24
Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 504, (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910), reprinted in 2 Weston,
supra note 2, at II.B.2; 6. Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines [Second Hague, VIII], Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3)
580 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) (entered into force with respect to the United States Jan.
26, 1910), reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.5; 7. Convention Concerning
Bombardments by Naval Forces in Time of War [Second Hague, IX], Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2351, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 604 (entered into force Jan. 26 1910), reprinted in 2
Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.6; 8. Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Naval War [Second Hague, XIII], Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 205 Consol. T.S. 395, 3
Martens Nouveau Recueil 713 (ser. 3) (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910), reprinted in 2 Weston,
supra note 2, II.B.8; 9. Declaration Relative to Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and
Explosives from Balloons [Second Hague, XIV], Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, 3 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (ser. 3) 745 (entered into force Nov. 27, 1909) (entered into force with respect to the
United States Nov. 27, 1909); 10. Convention Relating to the Non-Fortification and
Neutralisation of the Aaland Islands, Oct. 20, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 211 (entered into force April 6,
1922); 11. Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, Feb. 6,
1922, 25 L.N.T.S. 202, 13 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 643 (never entered into force); 12.
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in
14 I.L.M. 49 (entered into force with respect to each party to the Protocol upon the date of
deposit of its ratification or act of accession) (entered into force with respect to the United States
April 10, 1975); 13. Protocol No. III on the Control of Armaments [Treaty for Collaboration in
Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-Defence],-Oct. 23, 1943, 211
U.N.T.S. 362 (entered into force May 6, 1955), reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.35;
14. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, 54 AM. J. INTL L. 477
(1960) (entered into force June 23, 1961) (entered into force with respect to the United States
June 23, 1961); 15. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force Oct. 10,
1963) (entered into force with respect to the United States Oct. 10, 1963), reprinted in 2 I.L.M.
883, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.14; 16. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 386 (entered into
force Oct. 10, 1967) (entered into force with respect to the United States Oct. 10, 1967); 17.
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [Treaty of Tlatelolco] (InterAmerican), Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 (entered into force April 22, 1968),
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 521, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.16; 18. Additional Protocol I to the
Treaty of 14 February 1967 for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (InterAmerican), Feb. 14, 1967, T.I.A.S. No. 10147, 634 U.N.T.S. 362, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1405
(entered into force with respect to the United States Nov. 23, 1981); 19. Additional Protocol II to
the Treaty of 14 February 1967 for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (InterAmerican), Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 754, 634 U.N.T.S. 364, reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 1413 (entered
into force with respect to the United States May 12, 1971); 20. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force March 5,
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pillage of cultural property in the time of war.9 3 There is a divergence of
views among governments and experts as to which of these treaties rise to
1970) (entered into force with respect to the United States March 5, 1970), reprinted in 7 I.L.M.
809, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.17; 21. Treaty.on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor
and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955 U.N.T.S. 115
(entered into force May 18, 1972) (entered into force with respect to the United States May 18,
1972), reprinted in note 2, at II.0.18; 22. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their
Destruction, April 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into force March 26,
1975) (entered into force with respect to the United States March 26, 1975), reprinted in 11
I.L.M. 309, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.36; 23. Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Sbviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear
Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty, TTBT), July 3, 1974 reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 967, and
2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.24; 24. Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes
(Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, PNET), May 28, 1976 (entered into force Dec. 11, 1990),
reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 891, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.25; 25. Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,
opened for signatureMay 18, 1977, U.N. G.A. Res. 31/721 (XXXI), 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39),
at 36, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976), 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Oct. 5,
1978) (entered into force with respect to the United States Jan. 17, 1980), reprinted in 16 I.L.M.
88, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.19; 26. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force July 11, 1984), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at
II.E.23; 27. Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,
Oct. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. AJCONF.95/15, 1342 U.N.T.S. 7 (entered into force Dec. 2, 1983),
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.10; 28. Protocol on NonDetectable Fragments to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons [Protocol I], Oct. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. AJCONF.95/15 (1980) (entered into
force Dec. 2, 1983), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1529, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.10; 29.
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices to
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons,
Appendix C, [Protocol II], Oct. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (1980) (entered into force Dec.
2, 1983) (entered into force with respect to the United States Sept. 24, 1995), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 1529, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.0.10; 30. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Incendiary Weapons to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons [Protocol III], Oct. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (1980),
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1534 (entered into force Dec. 2, 1983 with provisions), reprinted in 2
Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.10; 31. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons [Protocol IV], Oct. 12,
1995, see 90 AMI. J. INT'L L. 484 (1996) (not yet in force), reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at
II.C.10; 32. South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty [Treaty of Rarotonga], signed at Rarotonga,
Cook Islands, Aug. 6, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1440, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.29;
33. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-21 (entered
into force April 29, 1997), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.39; 34.
Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Dec. 15, 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 635,
and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.C.33c; 35. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, signed
at Addis Ababa, June 21-23, 1996, reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 698, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at
II.C.33b.
93. See BAsSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS, supra note 6, Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and Regulations for the Execution of the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14 May 1954,
249 U.N.T.S. 240 (entered into force 7 Aug. 1956) reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at
II.B.15.
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the level of a general custom and which do not. Nevertheless, a general
custom has evolved from the cumulative effect of these treaties that weapons
that "cause unnecessary pain and suffering" are prohibited even though what
94
these weapons are is still the subject of debate.
The "Law of Geneva" (four Geneva conventions of 1949 and portions of
protocols I and II which embody customary law) are also deemed to have
risen to the level of a general custom.9 5 They are therefore binding on all
states irrespective of whether a given state has or has not ratified one of
them. 96 But it should be noted that some states maintain that not all of
Protocols I and II codify customary international law and therefore some of
their provisions are still deemed to be part of conventional law which is
applicable only to States Parties. As a result, there is an overlap in the
binding legal effect of these conventions since they are first binding on their
signatories, then also binding on the same signatories and on all other states
because they are part of customary law. But some governments, like the
United States, argue that only portions of protocols I and II, which the United
States has not yet ratified, have risen to the level of a general custom.
Selecting what is and what is not part of custom is not only a challenging
9 7
legal exercise, but one that is fraught with political considerations.
As earlier noted, the "Law of Geneva" is divided into two categories: (1)
"conflicts of an international character" where violations (war crimes) are
referred to as "grave breaches" 98-well defined, but applicable only to armed
94. For example, the U.S. takes the position that incendiary and laser weapons and land mines
are not included in that category.
95. See 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW supra note 74; Jordan Paust, Customary International
Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59 (1990).
See also, e.g., Meron, supra note 6; Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the
Formationof InternationalLaw, 90 AM. J. INTL L. 238 (1996).
96. See Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of June 1997:
ratifications, accessions and successions (Oct. 5, 1998), <http:lvww.icrc.org/unicc/icrnews>. See
also BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS, supra note 8, at, respectively, pp. 416-17, 426-27, 434-35,
440-41, 457-60 and 486-87. This position is bolstered by the number of ratifications for these
conventions. They are:
The First Geneva Convention of 1949:
The Second Geneva Convention of 1949:
The Third Geneva Convention of 1949:
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949:
Protocol I of 1977:
Protocol II of 1977:

188
188
188
188
152
144

See supra note 85 for the full citation to the first four Geneva Conventions. See supra, note 86
for the citations to Protocol I and Protocol II.
97. This was obvious in the 1997 Preparatory Committee for an International Criminal Court at
its second and third sessions.
98. See Geneva Conventions in Appendix III, at arts. 50 and 51 of the First and Second
Convention, reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.11-12 and arts. 130 and 147 of the
Third and Fourth Conventions, respectively, reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.13-14;
1977 Protocol I, supra note 86, infra Appendix III.
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conflicts taking place between states; and (2) "conflicts of a non-international
character" where violations are not referred to as "grave breaches"involving a foreign element, according to some, but applicable mainly to
armed conflicts between a state and a belligerent or insurgent group within
that state. There are, therefore, two regimes applicable to war crimes within
the "Law of Geneva": the "grave breaches" regime of the four Geneva
conventions of 1949 and Protocol I, in addition to the "violations" regime of
common Article 3 of the four Geneva conventions of 1949 and Protocol II.
Within the first "grave breaches" regime, war crimes are not limited to "grave
breaches" but extend to other transgressions of norms contained in these
codifications which also incorporate customary law. Within the second
"violations" regime there is lingering reluctance to consider all the
transgressions of norms contained in Protocol II as war crimes. In that
regime, "violations" of common Article 3 are deemed war crimes and require
no foreign element to make common Article 3 applicable; but, Protocol II,
which applies to this regime, precludes the application of common Article 3 to
conflicts between dissident groups within a given state. Thus, the two
regimes of the "Law of Geneva" exclude most of those conflicts that may be
deemed purely internal conflicts, including tyrannical regime victimization,
even though these types of conflicts have since caused most of the world's
wartime victimization since World War II.
As noted, conflicts of a "non-international character" are regulated in the
1949 Geneva conventions by a single article, common to all four
conventions--common Article 399 Protocol II expands upon common Article
3100 relative to what that article deems to be "violations" and not "grave
breaches." But, common Article 3 and Protocol II are limited in scope and do
not have the specificity or detail contained in the articles defining "grave
breaches." The "grave breaches" contained in common Articles 50, 51, 130,
and 147 of the 1949 Geneva conventions embrace nine categories of war
crimes:
1. wilful killing (I-IV conventions);
2. torture or inhuman treatment,
experiments (I-IV conventions);

including

biological

3. wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health (-IV conventions);
4. extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly (I, II, and IV conventions);
5. compelling a prisoner of war or a protected person to serve
in the forces of the hostile Power (III and IV conventions);
99. See Common Article 3 infra Appendix III.
100. See Protocol II, supranote 86, infra Appendix III.
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6. wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a protected person
of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the
Convention (III and IV conventions);
7. unlawful deportation or transfer of a protected person (IV
convention);
8. unlawful confinement
convention); and

of

a

protected

person

(IV

9. taking of hostages (IV convention).
To be considered a "grave breach," each of the categories listed above must be
committed against persons or property protected by the relevant conventions.
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva conventions does not categorically
establish that "violations" of that provision are war crimes, but scholars have
interpreted common Article 3 violations as constituting war crimes. 101 Article
4(2) of Protocol II, expanding on Article 3 of the four Geneva conventions,
provides:
Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the
following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1
are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever:
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental wellbeing of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel
treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of
corporal punishment;
(b) collective punishments;
(c) taking of hostages;
(d) acts of terrorism;
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and
any form of indecent assault;
(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
(g) pillage; and
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
Cognate provisions 102 further provide that certain fundamental protections be
observed: (1) humane treatment for detained persons, such as protection from
violence, torture, and collective punishment; (2) protection from intentional
attack, hostage-taking, and acts of terrorism of persons who take no part in
101. See generally LEVIE, supra note 3; Meron, supra note 6.
102. See Conventions cited supra note 85, at arts. 5 and 6.
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hostilities; (3) special protection for children to provide for their safety and
education and to preclude their participation in hostilities; (4) fundamental
due process for person against whom sentences are to be passed or penalties
executed; (5) protection and appropriate care for the sick and wounded, and
medical units which assist them; and (6) protection of the civilian population
from military attack, acts of terror, deliberate starvation, and attacks against
installations containing dangerous forces. However, Article 4(2) of Protocol II
is narrow in scope: (1) it applies only to internal conflicts in which dissident
armed groups are under responsible command and exercise control over such
a part of the national territory as to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations; (2) it has the effect of excluding many internal conflicts
in which dissident armed groups occupy no significant territory but conduct
sporadic guerrilla operations over a wide area; (3) it does not guarantee all
the protections of the Conventions for international armed conflicts, e.g.,
prisoner-of-war treatment for captured combatants; and (4) it does not
contain provisions to punish offenders-non-international conflicts are not
covered by the definition of "grave breaches" contained in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and its Protocol I.
The essential differences between the explicit obligations arising from the
two normative regimes deemed "grave breaches" and "violations" arise with
respect to the duties and rights associated with their enforcement. For "grave
breaches" the duties are: (1) to investigate; (2) to prosecute; (3) to extradite;
and (4) to assist through judicial cooperation of investigations; and the rights
include (1) the right for any state to rely on universal jurisdiction to
investigate, prosecute and punish; and the rights include; (2) the nonapplicability in national or international processes of statutes of
limitations;10 3 (3) the non-applicability of the defense of "obedience to superior
orders,"1 04; and (4) the non-applicability of immunities including that of Head
of State. 05 The same duties and rights are not explicit relative to "violations"

103. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, opened for signatureNov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (entered into force Nov.
11, 1970), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 68, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.E.16; European Convention
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
(Inter-European), Jan., 25, 1974, Europ. T.S. No. 82, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540 (not yet in force).
See also Christine van den Wyngaert, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Statutoiy
Limitations, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 74.
104. Article 8 of the London Charter removed the defense of "obedience to superior orders." See

London Charter, supra note 25, at art. 8. Further, Article 7 of the ICTY and Article 6 of the
ICTR both removed the defense of "obedience to superior orders" as well. See ICTY Statute infra
Appendix I, at art. 7; ICTR Statute infra Appendix I, at art. 6. For a historical evolution of the
defense, see Leslie C. Green, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, 27 CAN. Y.B. INT'L
L. 167 (1989); Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L.

REV. 1 (1973). See also Leslie C. Green, The Defence of Superior Orders in the Modern Law of
Armed Conflict, 31 ALBERTA L. REV. 320 (1993).
105. Article 7 of the London Charter removed the defense of immunity for "head of state." See
London Charter, supra note 25, at art. 7. Further, Principle III of the "Nuremberg Principles"
removed the defense of immunity from heads of state. See 1950 ILC Report infra Appendix I, at
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of common Article 3, and thus a normative gap exists with respect to the
enforcement consequences that arise out of transgressions of these two
regimes. 106 There is, however, a notable trend among legal experts to consider
such formalism as historically ddpass6 and to consider the same enforcement
consequences applicable to both legal regimes.
The formal distinctions discussed above, and the gaps that exist in their
scope, application, protection, and enforcement are no longer tenable. The
"writings of the most distinguished publicists" 01 7 agree that there should be
no distinctions between "grave breaches" and "violations" of common Article 3
and Protocol II; they agree that both contain equally enforceable prohibitions
carrying the same enforcement consequences. 08 They do so at least in part
because the overwhelming majority of post-World War II conflicts have been
of a "non-international character,"'10 9 and because these conflicts have
produced an overwhelming number of victims. As noted above, there have
been, since World War II, some 250 conflicts and internal tyrannical regime
victimizations that have produced an estimated 170 million casualties." 0
Thus, to maintain a distinction between these two legal regimes and their
enforcement consequences ignores the purpose of these regimes, which is to
protect innocent victims from harm.
For purposes of war crimes, however, the distinction between types of
conflicts and the legal regimes applicable to them does not apply with respect
to crimes against humanity and genocide. These two categories of crimes are
deemed applicable in time of peace as well as in time of war. The most
significant problems arising out of overlaps and gaps in the law of armed
conflict are the legal standards applicable in distinguishing between conflicts
of an international and non-international character, and in ascertaining the
relevant parts of conventional and customary law of armed conflicts
applicable to these contexts, considering that the two sets of norms mirror
one another."' Another layer of confusion originates in doctrines of
Principle III. The defense was also removed in the statutes for the ICTY and the ICTR. See
ICTY Statute infra Appendix I, at art. 7; ICTR Statute infra Appendix I, at art. 6.
106. Compare Common Article 3 infra Appendix III, with "grave breaches" of the Third and
Fourth Conventions, respectively Articles 130 and 147 in Appendix III.
107. One of the sources of international law as stated in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, U.N.T.S. No. 993, art. 38.
108. See generallyMeron, supra note 6.
109. See Bassiouni, supra note 14. See also, e.g., sources cited supra note 14.
110. See Balint, supra note 14. See generally sources cited supra note 14 and accompanying text.
111. These difficulties were evident in the work of the General Assembly's Preparatory
Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on the Definition of War
Crimes. See Report of the Preparatoy Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996); Report of the
Inter-Sessional Meeting From 19 to 30 Jan. 1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands, U.N. Doc.
AIAC.249/1998/L.13, (1998); Report of the PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an
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international law from which improvident extrapolations are made into the
law of armed conflicts; legal interpretation and analysis of these two
overlapping areas are thus frequently more confusing than they are
elucidating.
The foregoing observations were evidenced in two related judgments by
the ICTY. The first was in connection with the Tadij jurisdictional appeal
case." 2 Commenting on that judgment Professor Meron notes:
The appeals chamber's expansive interpretation that "laws or
customs of war" in Article 3 of the Tribunal's Statute reach
noninternational armed conflicts largely avoided the worst
possible consequences. However, the chamber refused to use
Article 3 of its Statute (laws and customs of war) as a conduit
to bring in as customary law conduct comprising grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions (grave breaches are the
subject of Article 2 of the Statute; these can be regarded as
customary law whose content parallels the pertinent
provisions of these Conventions). The grave breaches are the
principal crimes under the Conventions. Thus deprived of the
core of international criminal law in cases deemed to be
noninternational, the Tribunal can only raise the level of
actionable violations to crimes against humanity and perhaps,
in the future, genocide. Not only does this handicap the
Tribunal's ability to carry out its mandate, but some
commentators also criticize the resort to such heavy artillery
against evil, but relatively minor, actors. Disregarding
considerations of judicial economy, the appeals chamber has
therefore enabled the creation of a crazy quilt of norms that
would be applicable in the same conflict, depending on
whether
it
is
characterized
as
international
or
noninternational. No less, the potential for unequal and
inconsistent treatment of the accused is great. Fortunately,
until Tadid..., the decisions of the trial chambers on
indictments pursuant to Article 61 of the Tribunal's Rules of
Procedure and Evidence found that the situations involved
international armed conflicts and that the grave reaches

International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (1998) [hereinafter PrepCom
Committee]. See also the Commentaries of Jordan Paust in 13 NOUVELLES EtTUDES PtNALES (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1997) and l3bis NOUVELLES ETUDES PtNALES (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.
1998). See Appendix IV, for the text of the Final Report of the PrepCom and its correlation to
conventional and customary law norms.
112. Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid, (IT-94-I-T), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908. For a critical appraisal,
see George H. Aldrich, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 90 AM. J. INTL L. 64 (1996).
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avoiding potential

Meron then further notes that the decision was not inevitable, as the
proposition that the fighting was part of an international armed conflict-a
proposition advanced by the Commission of Experts, the U.S. Government,
and many scholars-was a position known to the majority of the appeals
chamber though one they chose not to adopt. Further, Meron notes, Judge
Georges Abi-Saab proposed terming the fighting as part of non-international
armed conflicts, but including "grave breaches" within the applicable
114
customary law.
The fact remains, however, that the ICTY eschewed this reasoning.
Worse, the subsequent Tadi6 judgment on the merits erroneously applied
another international law standard to the issue presented.1 1 5 In that decision,
the Tadi6 majority erroneously applied the international law standard of
state responsibility to determine whether a conflict is or is not of an
international character. In so doing, the Tribunal relied on the opinion of the
International Court of Justice in Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.).116 The Court, however, failed to
appreciate that the agency relationship needed to establish state
responsibility, essentially for the purposes of civil damages, is distinguishable
from the legal standard required to establish whether a given conflict is of an
international or non-international character. Meron, aptly commenting on
117
this confusion, writes:

113. Meron, supranote 7, at 238.
114. Id.
115. Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid, (IT-94-I-T), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908 (1997). See also, e.g.,
SCHARF, supra note 42.
116. 1986 ICJ Rep. 14.
117. Meron, supra note 7, at 237, 239. Professor Dinstein agrees that intervention by a foreign
state on behalf of the insurgents turns a civil war into an interstate war. Specifically with
regard to Yugoslavia Meron writes:
The Tadie .. trial chamber has already accepted that, before the announced
withdrawal of JNA forces from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
conflict was an international armed conflict. The facts of the situation and
the rules of international humanitarian law should determine whether the
JNA continued to be involved after that date and during the period pertinent
to the indictments; if so, the international character of the conflict would
have remained unchanged. The provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention
on termination of the application of the Convention, including Article 6, are
relevant, not the legal tests of imputability and state responsibility. Finally,
the appeals chamber would also be well-advised to abandon its adherence to
the literal requirements of the definition of protected persons and help adapt
it to the principal challenges of contemporary conflicts.
Meron, supra note 7, at 242.
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[The Tadij case] was not an issue of (state) responsibility at
all. Identifying the foreign intervenor was . . . only the
question of state responsibility. Conceptually, it cannot
determine whether a conflict is international or internal. In
practice, applying the Nicaragua test to the question in
produces artificial and incongruous conclusions.
Indeed, even a quick perusal of international law literature
would establish that imputability is not a test commonly used
in judging whether a foreign intervention leads to the
internationalization of the conflict and the applicability of
those rules of international humanitarian law that govern
armed conflicts of an international character.
This decision led several government experts at the ICC Diplomatic
Conference to express their fear that, unless the war crimes provision of
Article 8 was clearly and unambiguously drafted, that judges may, in the
future, interpret Article 8 in a confusing or expansive manner, and thus
create new law by judicial fiat. Such concern for strict judicial interpretation
did not however produce the desired lack of ambiguity. On the contrary, it
gave, in my opinion, more opportunities for non-strict interpretative
approaches.
Thus, in these two judgments, which are the first of an international
jurisdiction since the close of World War II and the subsequent proceedings at
Nuremburg" 8 and in the Far East,1 9 we find more confusion than clarity
regarding the following issues:

118. See London Charter, supra note 25. For the proceedings before the IMT, see International
Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, reported in TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (1949) (commonly known as the "Blue Series").
For the subsequent proceedings of the IMT, see TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1949) (commonly
known as the "Green Series").
119. See Special Proclamation Establishing an International Military Tribunal for the Far East
and Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No.
1589, at 3, 4 Bevans 20 (IMTFE Proclamation), reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.E.2.
On the same day General MacArthur issued his proclamation, the Charter for the IMTFE was
adopted. Pursuant to a policy decision by the Far Eastern Commission, the Charter was later
amended by General's Order No. 20, issued by MacArthur. See Charter for the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, Apr. 29, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 11, (IMTFE Charter),
reprintedin 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.E.2. See generally THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE
COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FAR EAST IN TWENTY-TwO VOLUMES (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds.,
1981); THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: COMPREHENSIVE INDEX AND GUIDE TO THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST IN FIVE VOLUMES (R. John
Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981); YUKI TANAKA, HIDDEN HORRORS: JAPANESE
WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR 11 (1996).
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Generally
1. What norms of conventional law of armed conflicts have
become part of customary law, and how is that evidenced?
2. What norms of customary law have been codified in
conventional law, and how is that evidenced?

B.

Specifically
1. Does customary law include all the "grave breaches" of the
1949 Geneva conventions?
2. Does customary law include all or some of the "grave
breaches" of Protocol I, and, if so, which ones?
3. Does customary law include common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva conventions?
4. Does customary law include all or some of the provisions
of Protocol II, and, if so, which ones?
5. What other treaties on the regulation of armed conflicts,
particularly those concerning the prohibition and use of
certain weapons, have become part of customary law, 120
and on what basis?

C.

Legal Standards
1. Are the standards applicable to state responsibility
applicable also to the determination of whether a conflict
is of an international or non-international character; and,
if applicable, is it exclusively applicable or simply
applicable as one of several legal standards?
2. Is the determination of the nature of a given armed
conflict based on one or more standards deemed part of
customary law, and, if so, to what extent does customary
law rely on legal standards that derive from:
(a) Common Article 3 of the 1949 conventions; and
(b) Protocol II.

These and other questions still loom large in the law of armed conflicts; and,
as stated above, they are reflected in the range of governmental positions on
the definition of war crimes in the draft statute of the ICC.121
120. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 8.
121. See PrepCom Committee, infra Appendix IV.
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In 1995, the United Nations General Assembly established an Ad Hoc
Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. 122 In
1996, it established a Preparatory Committee for an International Criminal
Court. 123 Subsequently, during three-and-a-half-years of deliberations, the
question of defining war crimes became the subject of detailed discussions.
Questions were raised, in particular, about whether all of the contents of
protocols I and II have risen to the level of customary law, about the specific
contents of customary law, and still more particularly, about the rules
governing conflicts of a non-international character and the prohibitions of
the use of certain weapons in all categories of conflicts. While there was no
dispute that the "grave breaches" provisions of the 1949 Geneva conventions
are applicable, and substantial agreement that most of the "grave breaches"
in Protocol I are included, there was less agreement that some of the Protocol
II prohibitions can be deemed part of custom. In fact, the texts proposed, and
the one adopted reflect, a partial regression from the norms contained in
Protocol I and a substantial regression from the norms contained in Protocol
II. The draft provision submitted to the diplomatic conference evidences these
divergent views, 124 as set forth in the chart contained in Appendix V detailing
the sources of law for war crimes. The chart was developed and circulated at
the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court 125 and, in setting forth the various sources for the provisions,
highlights the overlaps and gaps.
The ICC adopted a similar text, contained in Appendix V, but the
distinction between conflicts of an international and non-international
character is reflected in the distinction between "grave breaches" and other
violations of common Article 3 in this instance. Protocols I and II are neither
specifically nor entirely applied, but norms are taken selectively therefrom
and are listed under what can be termed "war crimes" under customary law.
Subparagraph 2(a) of Article 8 refers specifically to the "Grave Breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, . . " and lists eight such under
this heading:
(i)

Wilful killing;

(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments;

122. Report of the Ad Hoc Comnittee on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court,
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doe. A/50122 (1995).
123. See PrepCom Committee, infra Appendix IV.
124. Id.

125. Non- paper circulated at the December 1997 session of the Preparatory Committee for the
Establishment of an International Court, entitled Synopsis on War Crimes Relating to the
Informal Working Paper on War Crimes (A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.7), Dec. 3, 1997 infra
Appendix V.
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(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body
or health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly;
(v)

Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to
serve in the forces of a hostile Power;

(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected
person of the rights of fair and regular trial;
deportation
(vii) Unlawful
confinement;

or

transfer

or

unlawful

26

(viii)Taking of hostages.1

Subparagraph 2(b) of Article 8 refers to "Other serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in international armed conflict... ,"127 Itincorporates
the customary law of armed conflict and some of the provisions of Protocol I.
In subparagraphs 2(c) and 2(d) of Article 8, the ICC Statute then focuses
on the distinction between conflicts of an international character and those of
a non-international character. In so doing, it invokes the domain of common
Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva conventions. Subparagraph 2(c), focusing on
"the case of armed conflict not of an international character," refers to the
serious violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949,"128 thus adding the limitation of "serious" to the "violations" of
common Article 3 for the exclusive purposes of the ICC's statute.
Subparagraph 2(c), like subparagraph 2(a), embodies the contents of the 1949
Geneva conventions, the former relative to "grave breaches" and the latter
relative to the prohibitions contained in common Article 3. The latter
prohibits the following acts:
(i) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (ii) committing
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment; (iii) taking of hostages; (iv) the passing
of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally
129
recognized as indispensable.

126. ICC Statute, supra note 13, infra Appendix VI, at art. 8, para. 2(a).
127. Id at para. 2(b).
128. Id at para 2(c).
129. Id.
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Subparagraph 2(d) of Article 8 emphasizes, like Protocol II, that
subparagraph 2(c) "does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and specific acts of violence or other acts of a
similar nature."13 0 The specificity contained herein by far exceeds what
Protocol II contains and it is therefore specific to this statute.
Subparagraph 2(e) of Article 8 is the counterpart of subparagraph 2(b)
and it applies customary law to armed conflicts not of an international
character. What follows is an extensive list that includes most of the
provisions of Protocol II and overlaps in part with common Article 3. It also
adds several specifics that Protocol II does not contain, but which have come
to be recognized as part of customary law. Further, it iq progressive when it
comes to sexual violence in (vi) and to the protection of children in (vii). It
reads as follows:
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable
in armed conflicts not of an international character, within
the established framework of international law, namely, any
of the following acts:
(i)

intentionally directing attacks against the civilian
population as such or against individual civilians
not taking direct part in hostilities;

(ii)

intentionally directing attacks against buildings,
material, medical units and transport, and
personnel using the distinctive emblems of the
Geneva
conventions
in
conformity
with
international law;

(iii) intentionally directing attacks against personnel,
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in
a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission
in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under
the law of armed conflict;
(iv)

intentionally directing attacks against building
dedicated to religion, education, art, science or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals
and places where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not military objectives;

(v)

pillaging a town or place, even when taken by
assault;

130. Id at para 2(d).
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committing
rape,
sexual
slavery,
enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in Article
7, paragraph 2, enforced sterilization, and any other
form of sexual violence also constituting a serious
violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions;

(vii) conscripting or enlisting children under the age of
fifteen years into armed forces or groups using them
to participate actively in hostilities;
(viii) ordering the displacement of the civilian population
for' reasons related to the conflict, unless the
security of the civilians involved or imperative
military reasons so demand;
(ix)

killing or wounding treacherously a combatant
adversary;

(x)

declaring that no quarter will be given;

(xi) subjecting persons who are in the power of another
party to the conflict to physical mutilation or to
medical or scientific experiments of any kind which
are neither justified by the medical, dental or
hospital treatment of the person concerned nor
carried out in his interest, and which cause death to
or seriously endanger the health of such person or
persons;
(xii) destroying or seizing the property of an adversary
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of the conflict;
(f) Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international
character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other
acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in a
territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups.
The structure of the foregoing formulation of "war crimes" is thus divided
into four parts, reflecting the different sources of applicable law, conventional
and customary, and the two relevant contexts, of international and noninternational conflicts. Regrettably, these distinctions were maintained even
though the overlaps are glaringly evident. Suffice it to compare
subparagraphs 2(b) and 2(e) which incorporate what the drafters believed to
be customary law, even though it also clearly reflects existing conventional
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law, to wit, Protocol 11.131 The ICC missed the opportunity to eliminate these
distinctions and to focus on the protected persons and protected targets
irrespective of the conflicts' context. But, then, the ICC was an exercise in
political feasibility, not progressive codification. From this perspective, it
must be said that the definition of "war crimes" is as good as can be achieved
at the present time, taking into account the diversity of concerns and
interests.
V. CONCLUSION
Not only are there overlaps in some applications of the sources of law
relevant to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, there also are
gaps and ambiguities in their content and scope. So far, however, there is no
political will to close the gaps and eliminate the ambiguities. Thus, it is
necessary to examine these sources of law separately in order to establish
which source applies to which context and then to determine whether the
132
legal elements contained in the applicable sources apply to the facts.
Some 188 states have so far embodied "war crimes" in their military
codes. This is a requirement of the Geneva conventions and therefore every
state party must domesticate their provisions and criminalize "grave
breaches" violations. However, prosecutions for "war crimes" or "grave
breaches" or an equivalent term (such as violations of the military code) have,
with the exception of the prosecutions arising out of World War 11, 133 been
few and far between. Since 1949, Germany has prosecuted an estimate of
60,000 cases mostly in the categories of genocide and war crimes, but the
United States, in relation to the Vietnam War, prosecuted only two cases for
war crimes-the Calley 134 and Medina 135 cases. It is noteworthy, too, that the
only case brought against one of the World War II Allies for war crimes, by
Japanese citizens for the use by the United States of atomic weapons against
Japan, which killed and injured an estimated 225,000 innocent civilians, 136

131. The United States did not ratify either Protocol and wanted to avoid any references to
these Protocols, insisting that whatever norms were derived therefrom should be drafted as part
of customary law. In a sense the United States' position is defensible because the Protocols
essentially embody customary law and that too evidences the overlap between the two sources
of applicable law.
132. For a distinction between humanitarian law norms and human rights law norms as
customary law, see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW (1989).
133. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supranote 10.
134. U.S. v. Calley, C.M. 426402, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1971); 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973); 22 C.M.A. 534
(1973).
135. U.S. v. Medina, C.M.A. 403; 43 C.M.R. 243 (1971).
136. 29 THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 1022 (1990).
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was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Japan on technical jurisdictional
3
grounds. 7
With respect to "crimes against humanity," Canada, France, and Israel
have been the only countries to have carried out prosecutions. In Israel, the
Eichmann 138 and Demjanjuk139 cases were carried out, both for crimes not
committed in the territory of the prosecuting state. Demjanjuk was acquitted
because he turned out to be the wrong person. In France, prosecutions have
occurred for Barbie, 140 Touvier, 141 and Papon. 142 In 1989, Canada prosecuted

137. Shimoda v. The State, 355 Hanrel Jiho (Supreme Court of Japan 7 December 1963); also
quoted in part in 2 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1688. See also Richard A. Falk, The Shimoda
Case:A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks Upon Hiroshimaand Nagasaki,59 AM. J. INT'L L.
759 (1965). The claim in that case was against the United States of America for dropping atomic
bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in violation of the laws and customs of war.
138. See Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Israel Dist. Court of Jerusalem, 1961), 36
I.L.R. 5 (1962), (Supreme Court of Israel 1962), 36 I.L.R. 277 (1962). See also, e.g., GIDEON
HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM (1966).
139. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986).
140. The Barbie judgments:
Matter of Barbie, GAZ. PAL. JUR. 710 (Cass. Crim. Oct. 6, 1983); Judgment of Oct. 6, 1983,
Cass. Crim., 1984 D.S. Jur. 113, Gaz. Pal. Nos. 352-54 (Dec. 18-20, 1983), 1983 J.C.P. II G,
No. 20,107, J.D.I. 779 (1983); Judgment of Jan. 26, 1984, Cass. Crim., 1984 J.C.P. II G, No.
20,197 (Note Ruzid), J.D.I. 308 (1984); Judgment of Dec. 20, 1985, Cass. Crim., 1986 J.C.P.
II G, No. 20,655, 1986 J.D.I.; Judgment of June 3, 1988, Cass. Crim., 1988 J.C.P. II G, No.
21,149 (Report of Counselor Angevin).
For information on the Barbie case see generally LADISLAS DE HOYAS, KLAUS BARBIE (Nicholas
Courtin trans., 1985); BRENDAN MURPHY, THE BUTCHER OF LYON (1983).
141. The Touvier judgments:
Judgment of Feb. 6, 1975, Cass. Crim., 1975 D.S. Jur. 386, 387 (Report of Counselor
Chapan), 1975 Gaz. Pal. Nos. 124-26 (May 4-6, 1975); Judgment of Oct. 27, 1975 Chambre
d'accusation de la cour d'appel de Paris, 1976 D.S. Jur. 260 (Note Coste-Floret), 1976 Gaz.
Pal. Nos. 154-55, at 382; Judgment of June 30, 1976, Cass. Crim., 1977 D.S. Jur. 1, 1976
Gaz. Pal. Nos. 322, 323, 1976 J.C.P. II G, No. 18,435; Judgment of Nov. 27, 1992, Cass.
Crim., 1993 J.C.P. II G, No. 21,977; Judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, Cour d'appel de Paris,
Premidre chambre d'accusation, at 133-62, reprinted in part in 1992 Gaz. Pal. 387, 387-417;
Judgment of June 2, 1993, Cour d'appel de Versailles, Premi6re chambre daccusation 31.
For information on the Touvier case see generally ERIC CONAN & HENRY ROUSSO, VICHY, UN
PASS9 QUI NE PASSE PAS (1994); ALAIN JAKUBOWICZ & RENP, RAFFIN, TOUVIER HISTOIRE DU
PROCS (1995); ARNO KLARSFELD, TOUVIER UN CRIME FRANCAIS (1994); JACQUES TRPMOLET DE
VILLERS, L'AFFAIRE TOUVIER, CHRONIQUE D'UN PROCtS EN ID9OLOGIE (1994).
142. The Papon case:
Papon was indicted on September 18, 1996; the indictment was confirmed on January 23,
1997; Judgment of Sept. 18, 1996, Chambre d'accusation de la cour d'appel de Bordeaux
(unpublished), affirmed Judgment of Jan. 23, 1997, Cass. Crim., 1997 J.C.P. II G, No.
22,812. In April 1998 Maurice Papon was convicted for "crimes against humanity" and
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. See Craig R. Whitney, Ex-Vichy Aide Is Convicted and
Reaction Ranges Wide, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at Al; Craig R. Whitney, Vichy

Fall 1998]

NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OFINTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

235

the first case under a 1987 statute that permits retrospective application of
international law. 143 This writer served as Canada's chief legal expert in
testifying on what constituted "crimes against humanity" before 1945. Regina
resulted in the acquittal of Hungarian Gendarmerie Captain Finta on the
facts but the judgment recognized the existence of "crimes against humanity"
under international law before 1945. Prosecutions before the ICTY and ICTR
have included "war crimes," "crimes against humanity," and "genocide," but
when the opportunity arose to prosecute Pol Pot for such crimes in Cambodia,
144
it was not seized.
Many of the specific acts deemed criminal are contained within the
definitions of "war crimes," "crimes against humanity," and "genocide." That
is where the overlap exists. Thus, legal questions arise as to when the same
acts constitute one or the other of these three crimes. At this point, a jurist
must examine the other legal elements required in the sources of law
applicable to these three categories of crime. The "grave breaches" of the 1949
Geneva conventions 145 and Protocol 1146 are the clearest enunciation of what
Official Found Guilty of HelpingDeport Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at A8; and Charles
Trueheart, Verdict Nears in Trial of Vichy Official, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1998, at A21.
For information on the Papon case, see generally Laurent Greilsamer, Maurice Papon, la vie
,nasquge, LE MONDE, Dec. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Monde File; Barry
James, The Final Trial for Vichy? A Model French Bureaucrat Accused, IN'L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 6-7, 1996, at 2.
For additional information on these cases and French prosecution of war criminals in general,
see generally Leila Sadat Wexler, National Prosecutionsfor International Crimes: The French
Experience, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW supra note 74; Leila Sadat Wexler, Prosecutions
for Crimes Against Humanity in French Municipal Law: International Implications, in ASIL
PROCEEDINGS 270-76 (1997); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretationof the Nuremberg Principles
by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 289 (1994); Leila Sadat Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator
Paul Touvier for Crimes Against Humanity in France,20 J. L. & SOC. INQUIRY 191 (1995); Leila
Sadat Wexler, Prosecutions for Crimes Against Humanity in French Municipal Law:
InternationalImplications (Working Paper No. 97-4-3, Washington University School of Law,
1997). See also CHALANDON & NIVELLE, supra note 54; Jacques Francillon, Crimes de guerre,
Crimes contra l'humnanitg, JURIS-CLASSEUR, DROIT INT'L, FASCICuLE 410 (1993).
143. Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701. See Irwin Cotler, Bringing Nazi War Crimninals in
Canada to Justice: A Case Study, in ASIL PROCEEDINGS 262-69 (1997); Leslie C. Green,
CanadianLaw, War Crimnes and Crimnes Against Humanity, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 217 (1988);
Mich~le Jacquart, La notion de crine contre l'Humnanitg en droit internationalcontemnporain et
en droit Canadien, 21 REVUE G2N9RALE DE DROIT 607 (1990). See also Barry H. Dubner, The
Law of International Sea Piracy, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLITICS 471 (1979); Report of the
Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals (Jules Deschines ed. 1986); Sharon A. Williams,
Laudable PrinciplesLacking Application: The Prosecutionof War Criminals in Canada, in THE
LAW OF WAR CRIMES 151 (Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997).
144. See sources cited supra note 58. See also Seth Mydans, Death of Pol Pot: Pol Pot, Brutal
Dictator Who Forced Cambodians to Killing Fields, Dies at 73, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1998, at.
A14.
145. See Conventions cited supranote 85.
146. See 1977 Protocol I, supra note 86.
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the elements of "war crimes" are, but that is because they apply to the context
of conflicts of an international character. This is not quite the case with
respect to common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva conventions 147 and Protocol
11,148 which apply to conflicts of a non-international character, but with the
exclusion in Protocol II of conflicts between internal dissident groups. Still,
the gap between normative proscriptions applicable to the two contexts of
conflicts exists, as does the overlap between these violations. The overlaps
essentially are aimed at individual deviant conduct, the same type of criminal
conduct that falls also within the scope of crimes against humanity and
genocide, since the latter two crimes apply to all contexts of armed conflicts
as well as to other non-armed conflicts contexts and to tyrannical regime
victimization. Clearly, such a situation need not exist since it would be easy
to articulate the elements of each of these three categories of crimes clearly,
in a way that prevents these unnecessary overlaps and gaps. So far, however,
the political will to do so is nonexistent.
Because there is a connection between the rigors of evidentiary
requirements to prove "war crimes," ".crimes against humanity," and
"genocide," and access to that evidence, the major governments who have the
capacity to obtain such evidence remain in control of its use, and thereby in
control of any eventual prosecution. This leaves such governments with the
149
option to barter the pursuit of justice in exchange for political settlements.
An examination of what happened in all types of post-World War II conflicts
clearly indicates that the pursuit of justice has been almost always bartered
away for the pursuit of political settlements. 150 Consequently, the pursuit of
151
justice has become part of the toolbox of political settlement negotiations.
This is true for all three major crimes, essentially because they are committed
by armies, police, and paramilitary groups which act pursuant to orders from
the state's highest authorities. The need for an integrated codification of
these three categories of crimes is self-evident. But when that opportunity
arose in connection with the establishment of a permanent international
criminal court, it was carefully avoided for lack of political will by many
governments, including the major powers.
The road ahead is arduous and the same hurdles that have long existed
continue to bar the way for the effective protection of the victims of these
three major crimes. The voices of millions of victims since World War I
continue to cry unheard by the politicians of this world, and the sway of
conscience represented by civil society is insufficient to overcome the
147. See Conventions cited supra note 85.
148. See 1977 Protocol II, supra note 86.
149. See Bassiouni, supra note 14.
150. See id. See also Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 10; TRANSNATIONAL
JUSTICE (3 vols., Neil Kritz ed., 1995).
151. W. Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintaining Public
Order,6 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 175 (1995).
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steadfastness of realpolitik. To recall the words of a popular ballad of the
sixties: 'When will they ever learn."
Impunity for international crimes, and systematic and widespread
violations of fundamental human rights, is a betrayal of our human solidarity
with the victims of conflicts to whom we owe a duty of justice, remembrance,
and redress. To remember and to bring perpetrators to justice is a duty we
owe also to our own humanity and to the prevention of future
victimization. 152 To paraphrase George Santayana, if we cannot learn from
the lessons of the past and stop the practice of impunity, we are condemned
to repeat the same mistakes and to suffer their consequences. The reason for
our commitment to this goal can be found in the eloquent words of John
Donne:
No man is an island, entire of itself;
every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main...
Any man's death diminishes me because I am involved in mankind,
and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls;
it tolls for thee ....153

152. To paraphrase the classic and profoundly insightful characterization of George Orwell,
"Who controls the past, controls the future; who controls the present, controls the past." GEORGE
ORWELL, 1984 (2d ed. 1977). Thus, to record the truth, educate the public, preserve the memory,
and try the accused, it is possible to prevent abuses in the future. See Stanley Cohen, State
Crimes of PreviousRegimes: Knowledge, Accountabitlity and the Policy of the Past, 20 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 7, 49 (1995).
153. JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS XVII (1624).
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Appendix I
Special Proclamation Establishing an International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 3, 4;
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
approved Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 11, 4, reprinted in 2
Weston II.E.2.
Article 5(c)
Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed before or during the war, or
persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of
such plan.

Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of
War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity, 20
December 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany,
No. 3, Berlin, January 31, 1946, reprinted in BENJAMIN B. FERENCz, AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 488

(1980).
Article II(c):
Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and offences, including but not limited
to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture,
rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, whether or not in
violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.

Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 5 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 12), at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), 44 AM. J. INT'L L.
126 [1950 ILC Report], reprinted in 2 Weston II.E.4.
PRINCIPLE VI:
(c) Crimes against humanity:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts
done against any civilian population, or persecution on political, racial or
religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried
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on in execution of or in connexion with any crime against peace or any war
crime.

Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
Article 2:
The following acts are offences against the peace and security of mankind:
Inhumane acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, or persecutions, committed against any civilian
population on social, political, racial, religious, or cultural
grounds by the authorities of a State or by private individuals
acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.

Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
Report of the International Law Commission on its Forty-Third
Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A146/10 (1991).
Article 21. Systematic or mass violations of human rights.
An individual who commits or orders the commission of any of the following
violations of human rights:
- murder
-

torture

- establishing or maintaining over persons a status of slavery, servitude
or forced labour
- persecution on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds in a
systematic manner or on a mass scale, or
- deportation or forcible transfer of population shall, on conviction thereof,
be sentenced [to ...]
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Statute of the International Tribunal (for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of the Former Yugoxlavia), May 25, 1993, S.C. Res.
827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 32
I.L.M. 1159 (1993)[ICTY Statute], reprintedin 2 Weston II.E.10.
Article 5:
Crimes against humanity
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any
civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecution on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) Establishing
the International Tribunal For Rwanda, November 8, 1994, S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1598 [ICTR Statute], reprinted in 2 Weston, II.E.12.
Article 3:
Crimes against humanity
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute
persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation;
(e) Imprisonment;
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(f) Torture;
(g) Rape;
(h) Persecution on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) Other inhumane acts.

Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
Titles and Articles on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind adopted by the InternationalLaw Commission on
its forty-eight session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. AICN.4L.532
(1996), revised by U.N. Doc. A/CN.4L.532/Corr. 1 and U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4L.532/Corr.3.
Article 18:
Crimes against humanity
A crime against humanity means any of the following acts, when committed
in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a
Government or by any organization or group:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) torture;
(d) enslavement;
(e) persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds;
(f) institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds
involving the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms
and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population;
(g) arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(h) arbitrary imprisonment;
(i) forced disappearance of persons;
(j) rape, enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse;
(k) other inhumane acts which severely damage physical or mental
integrity, health or human dignity, such as mutilation and severe
bodily harm.

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Rome

[Vol. 8:199

Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.

A/Conf.183/9 (1998) [ICC Statute].

Article 7:
Crimes against humanity
1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1:
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in
paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack;
(b) "Extermination" includes the intentional infliction of conditions of
life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine,
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population;
(c) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the
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exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in
particular women and children;
(d) "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive
acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without
grounds permitted under international law;
(e) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under
the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions;
(f) "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement, of a woman
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations
of international law. This definition shall not in any way be
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy;
(g) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the
identity of the group or collectivity;
(h) "The crime of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character similar
to those referred to in' paragraph 1, committed in the context of an
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by
one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed
with the intention of maintaining that regime;
(i)

"Enforced disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the
intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.

3. For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term "gender"
refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The
term "gender" does not indicate any meaning different from the above.
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Appendix II
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 28 I.L.M. 763 (entered into
force Jan. 12, 1951) (entered into force with respect to the United
States Nov. 25,, 1989) [Genocide Convention], reprinted in 2 Weston
II.E.3.
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Statute of the International Tribunal (for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of the Former Yugoxlavia), May 25, 1993, S.C. Res.
827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 32
I.L.M. 1159 [ICTY Statute], reprintedin 2 Weston II.E.10.
Article 4
Genocide
1. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing
any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
3. The following acts shall be punishable:
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(a) genocide;
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity in genocide.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 Establishing the
International Tribunal For Rwanda, November 8, 1994, S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1598 [ICTR Statute], reprinted in 2 Weston II.E.12.
Article 2
Genocide
1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute
persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of
committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
3. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.

246

TRANSNATIONALLAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 8:199

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
AIConf.183/9 (1998) [ICC Statute].
Article 6
Genocide
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
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Appendix III
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
[Second Hague, IV], signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631, entered into force 26 January 1910; entered into
force with respect to the United States 26 January 1910 [hereinafter
1907 Hague Convention], reprinted in 2 Weston II.B.1.
Article 22:
1. The belligerents shall not have the unlimited right of choice of methods
they use to attack the enemy.

Article 23:
1. Apart from the prohibition covered by special agreements, the following are
especially prohibited:
a. the use of poison or poisoned weapons
b. killing or wounding through the betrayal of individuals from the
enemy nation or army
c. killing or wounding an enemy who, having laid down his or her arms
or no longer able to defend himself or herself, has surrendered
d. to declare that no quarter shall be given
e. to use arms, projectiles, or materials designed to cause unnecessary
harm
f. to misuse the parliamentary flag, the national flag or the military
insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive marks of
the Geneva Convention
g. to destroy or to seize the enemy property, except cases where such
destruction or seizure are necessary for the prosecution of the war
h. to declare that the national rights of the other Party are abolished,
suspended or unrecognized in law
2. It is also forbidden to a belligerent to force nationals of the opposing Party
to take part in military operations directed against their country, even if they
have been in its service prior to the start of the war.

Article 24:
1. Military ploys and the use of the resources required to discover intelligence
about the enemy and on the ground are considered to be legitimate.
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Article 25:
1. It is forbidden to attack or bomb, by any means whatsoever, towns,
villages, human habitations or buildings which are undefended.

Article 26:
1. The commander of the attacking forces, before commencing the bombing,
and except in the case of a heavy attack, must do everything he can to warn
the authorities.

Article 27:
1. In sieges or bombings, every possible measures must be taken to spare, as
far as possible, buildings dedicated to worship, the arts, the sciences and
social welfare, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and
wounded are assembled, on condition that these are not also used for military
purposes.
2. It is the duty of the besieged to designate such buildings or places of
assembly using special, visible signs which shall be notified in advance to the
besiegers.

Article 28:
1. It is forbidden to allow looting of a town or locality captured in an attack.

Article 50 of Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 4 (entered into force 21
October 1950) (entered into force with respect to the United States
February 2, 1956), reprinted in 2 Weston II.B.11; Article 51 of Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force October 21, 1950)
(entered into force with respect to the United States February 2,
1956), reprintedin 2 Weston II.B.12; Article 130 of Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,-August 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (1953) (entered into
force 21 October 1950) (entered into force with respect to the United
States February 2, 1956), reprinted in 2 Weston II.B.13; and Article
147 of Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (entered into force October 21, 1950)
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(entered into force with respect to the United States February 2,
1956), reprintedin 2 Weston II.B.14.

Article 130 (Third Convention)
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected
by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the
hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and
regular trial prescribed in this Convention.

Article 147 (Fourth Convention)
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected
by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful
confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in
the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of
hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts of 8 June 1977 [1977 Protocol I], December 12, 1977, U.N.
Doc. A/32/144 (1977) Annex I, referenced in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (entered
into force 7 December 1978), reprinted in 2 Weston II.B.20.

Article 85 - Repression of breaches of this Protocol
1. The provisions of the Conventions relating to the repression of breaches
and grave breaches, supplemented by this Section, shall apply to the
repression of breaches and grave breaches of this Protocol.
2. Acts described as grave breaches in the Conventions are grave breaches of
this Protocol if committed against persons in the power of an adverse Party
protected by Articles 44, 45 and 73 of this Protocol, or against the wounded,
sick and shipwrecked of the adverse Party who are protected by this Protocol,
or against those medical or religious personnel, medical units or medical
transports which are under the control of the adverse Party and are protected
by this Protocol.
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3. In addition to the grave breaches defined in Article 11, the following acts
shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed wilfully,
in violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death or
serious injury to body or health:
(a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of
attack;
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population
or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects,
as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii);
(c) launching an attack against works or installations containing
dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects,
as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii);
(d) making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of
attack;
(e) making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hors
de combat;
(f) the perfidious use, in violation of Article 37, of the distinctive emblem
of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other protective
signs recognized by the Conventions or this Protocol.
4. In addition to the grave breaches defined in the preceding paragraphs and
in the Conventions, the following shall be regarded as grave breaches of this
Protocol, when committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions or the
Protocol:
(a) the transfer by the occupying Power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or
transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory
within or outside this territory, in violation of Article 49 of the
Fourth Convention;
(b) unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians;
(c) practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices
involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial
discrimination;
(d) making the clearly-recognized historic monuments, works of art or
places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage
of peoples and to which special protection has been given by special
arrangement, for example, within the framework of a competent
international organization, the object of attack, causing as a result
extensive destruction thereof, where there is no evidence of the
violation by the adverse Party of Article 53, sub-paragraph (b), and
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when such historic monuments, works of art and places of worship
are not located in the immediate proximity of military objectives;
(e) depriving a person protected by the Conventions or referred to in
paragraph 2 of this Article of the rights of fair and regular trial.
5. Without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and of this
Protocol, grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war
crimes.

Common Article 3 in each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force October 21, 1950)
(entered into force with respect to the United States Feb. 2, 1956),
reprinted in 2 Weston II.B.11; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) (entered into force with
respect to the United States Feb. 2, 1956), reprinted in 2 Weston
II.B.12; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 119
(1953) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) (entered into force with
respect to the United States Feb. 2, 1956), reprinted in 2 Weston
II.B.13; 53 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
50 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) (entered into
force with respect to the United States Feb. 2, 1956), reprinted in 2
Weston II.B.14.

Article 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:
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(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
upon personal dignity,
(c) outrages
humiliating and degrading treatment;

in

particular

(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties
to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other
provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

Article 4 - Fundamental guarantees
1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take a part
in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to
respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors.
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts
against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever:
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of
persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as
torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
(b) collective punishments;
(c) taking of hostages;
(d) acts of terrorism;
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of
indecent assault;
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(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
(g) pillage;
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
3. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in
particular:
(a) they shall receive an education, including religious and moral
education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the
absence of parents, of those responsible for their care;
(b) all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of
families temporarily separated;
(c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall
neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to
take part in hostilities;
(d) the special protection provided by this Article to children who
have not attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable
to them if they take a direct part in hostilities despite the'
provisions of sub-paragraph (c) and are captured;
(e) measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with
the consent of their parents or persons who by law or custom are
primarily responsible for their care, to remove children
temporarily from the area in which hostilities are taking place to
a safer area within the country and ensure that they are
accompanied by persons responsible for" their safety and wellbeing.
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Appendix IV
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (1998)
[hereinafter PrepCom Committee].

War crimes
For the purpose of the present Statute, war crimes means:
A. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely,
any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the
provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(a) wilful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the
forces of a hostile Power;
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the
rights of fair and regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
(h) taking of hostages.
B. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict within the established framework of
international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(a) Option 1
intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such,
as well as individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
Option 2
No paragraph (a).
(a bis) Option 1
intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects which are not
military objectives;
Option 2
No paragraph (a his).
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(b) Option 1
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which is not justified by military necessity;
Option 2
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated;
Option 3
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment;
Option 4
No paragraph (b).
(b bis) Option 1
intentionally launching an attack against works or installations
containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will
cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated;
Option 2
No paragraph (b bis).
(c) Option 1
attacking or bombarding, by whatever means,
dwellings or buildings which are undefended;

towns, villages,

Option 2
making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the objects of
attack;
(d) killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or
having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
(e) making improper use of flag of truce, of the flag or of the military
insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well
as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions, resulting in
death or serious personal injury;
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(f) Option 1
the transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies;
Option 2
the transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer
of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or
outside this territory;
Option 3
(i) the establishment of settlers in an occupied territory and changes
to the demographic composition of an occupied territory;
(ii) the transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or
transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory
within or outside this territory;
Option 4
No paragraph (f).
(g) Option 1
intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and
places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are
not being used at the time for military purposes;
Option 2
intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes;
(h) subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse Party to
physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind
which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his interest, and
which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person
or persons;
(i) killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army;
(j) declaring that no quarter will be given;
(k) destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
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(1) declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the
rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party;
(m) compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the
operations of war directed against their own country, even if they
were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war;
(n) pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(o) Option 1
employing the following weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare which are calculated to cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering:
(i) poison or poisoned weapons,
(ii) asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous
liquids, materials or devices,
(iii) bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body,
such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely
cover the core or is pierced with incisions,
(iv) bacteriological (biological) agents
purposes or in armed conflict,

or

toxins

for

hostile

(v) chemical weapons as defined in and prohibited by the 1993
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On
Their Destruction;
Option 2
employing the following weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering:
(i) poison or poisoned weapons,
(ii) asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous
liquids, materials or devices,
(iii) bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body,
such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely
cover the core or is pierced with incisions,
(iv) bacteriological (biological) agents
purposes or in armed conflict,

or

toxins

for

hostile

(v) chemical weapons as defined in and prohibited by the 1993
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On
Their Destruction,
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(vi) such other weapons or weapons systems as become the
subject of a comprehensive prohibition pursuant to customary
or conventional international law;
Option 3
employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare
which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate;
Option 4
employing the following weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate:
or
employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare
which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate, such as but not
limited to:
(i)

poison or poisoned weapons,

(ii)

asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous
liquids, materials or devices,

(iii)

bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body,
such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely
cover the core or is pierced with incisions,

(iv)

bacteriological (biological) agents or toxins for hostile
purposes or in armed conflict,

(v)

chemical weapons as defined in and prohibited by the 1993
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
On Their Destruction,

(vi) nuclear weapons,
(vii) anti-personnel mines,
(viii) blinding laser weapons,
(ix) such other weapons or weapons systems as become the
subject of a comprehensive prohibition pursuant to
customary or conventional international.law;
(p) Option 1
committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
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Option 2
committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment as well as practices of apartheid and other
inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal
dignity based on racial discrimination;
(p hiDs

committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual
violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions;

(q) utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render
certain points, areas or military forces immune from military
operations;
(r) intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical
units and transport, and personnel using, in conformity with
international law, the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions;
(s) intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by
depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including
wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva
Conventions;
(t) Option 1
forcing children under the age of fifteen years to take direct part in
hostilities.
Option 2
recruiting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or
using them to participate actively in hostilities.
Option 3
(i) recruiting children under the age of fifteen years into armed
forces or groups; or
(ii) allowing them to take part in hostilities;
Option 4
No paragraph (t).

OPTION I
Sections C and D of this article apply to armed conflicts not of an
international character and thus do not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence
or other acts of a similar nature.
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C. In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious
violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against
persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(c) taking of hostages;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as
indispensable.
D. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflicts not of an international character, within the established
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(a) Option 1
intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such,
as well as individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
Option 2
No paragraph (a).
(b) intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical
units and transport, and personnel using, in conformity with
international law, the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions;
(c) Option 1
intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and
places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are
not being used at the time for military purposes;
Option 2
intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes;
(d) pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
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(e) committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(e his) committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual
violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3 common
to the four Geneva Conventions;
(f) Option 1
forcing children under the age of fifteen years to take direct part in
hostilities;
Option 2
recruiting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or
groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities;
Option 3
(i) recruiting children under the age of fifteen years into armed
forces or groups; or
(ii) allowing them to take part in hostilities;
Option 4
No paragraph (f).
(g) ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons
related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or
imperative military reasons so demand;
(h) killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;
(i) declaring that no quarter will be given;
(j) subjecting persons who are in the power of another Party to the
conflict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments
of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or
hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his
interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of
such person or persons;
(k) destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of
the conflict;
(1) Option 1
No provision on prohibited weapons.
Option 2
A reference to arms, in the light of the discussions on paragraph B(o).
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OPTION II
Insert the following provisions in section D:
- intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by
depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including
wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva
Conventions;
- intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment;
- intentionally launching an attack against works or installations
containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated;
- slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
OPTION III
Delete the opening clause of sections C and D.
OPTION IV
Delete section D.
OPTION V
Delete sections C and D.

Elsewhere in the Statute:
Option 1
The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court shall
have jurisdiction in respect of the crimes listed in article X (war
crimes) only when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a
large-scale commission of such crimes.
Option 2
The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The
Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of the crimes listed in
article X (v*ar crimes) in particular when committed as a part of a
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
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Option 3

No provision on threshold.
Article Y
(relating to the part of the Statute dealing with the definition of crimes)
Without prejudice to the application of the provisions of this Statute, nothing
in this part of the Statute shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in
any way existing or developing rules of international law.
N.B.
- Article Y could constitute a separate article or could be placed in
article 5 (Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court).
- Article 21, paragraph 3 (Nullum crimen sine lege) and article 20
(Applicable law) deal with related issues.
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Appendix V
Non-paper circulated at the December 1997 session of the
Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, entitled Synopsis on War Crimes Relating to the
Informal Working Paper on War Crimes (A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.7),
3 December 1997.

Draft article as contained in
A/AC.249/1997WG.1/CRP.7

Sources

Reference
to
A/AC.249
I
1997/L.5
A

A. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following
acts against persons or property protected
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva
Convention:
(a) wilful killing;

Art. 50 GC I;
Art. 51 GC II;
Art. 130 GC
III; Art. 147
GC IV

A (a)

(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments;

Art. 50 GC I;
Art. 51 GC II;
Art. 130 GC
III; Art. 147
GC IV

A (b)

(c) wilfully causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or health;

Art. 50 GC I;
Art. 51 GC II;
Art. 130 GC
III; Art. 147
GC IV

A (c)

(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly;

Art. 50 GC I;
Art. 51 GC II;
Art. 147 GC
IV

A (d)

(e) compelling a prisoner of war or other
protected person to serve in the forces of a
hostile Power;

Art. 130 GC
III; Art. 147
GC IV

A (e)
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(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other
protected person of the rights of a fair and
regular trial;

Art. 130 GC
III; Art. 147
GC IV

A (f)

(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or
unlawful confinement;

Art. 147 GC
IV

A (g)

(h) taking of hostages.

Art. 147 GC
IV

A (h)

B. Other serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in international armed
conflict within the established framework of
international law, namely any of the following
acts:

B

(a) intentionally directing attacks against the
civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities; 54

Art. 51 paras.
2 and 3 Add.
Prot. I; Art.
85 para. 3 (a)
Add. Prot. I

[(b) Intentionally launching an attack with the
knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects [or widespread, longterm and severe damage to the natural
environment] which is not justified by military
necessity;] 155

cf. Art. 57
B 1. (b)
para. 2 (a) (iii)
Add. Prot. I as
well as Art. 35
para. 3 Add.
Prot. I; Art.
85 para. 3 (b)
Add. Prot. I

(c) attacking or bombarding, by whatever
means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings
which are undefended;

Art. 25 Hague
IV 1907

(d) killing or wounding a combatant who,
having laid down his arms or having no longer
means of defence, has surrendered at
discretion;

Art. 23 para.
B 1. (e)
1 (c) Hague IV

B 4. (m);
cf. also

B 1. (a)

B 1. (d)

154. The view was expressed that attacks against civilian objects should be considered in this
context.
155. It has been accepted that it will be necessary to insert a.provision, probably in the general
principles section, which sets out the elements of knowledge and intent which must be found to
have existed for an accused to be convicted of a war crime. For example, "in order to conclude
that an accused had the knowledge and the criminal intention required to be convicted of a
crime, the Court must first determine that, taking account of the relevant circumstances of, and
information available to, the accused at the time, the accused had the requisite knowledge and
intent to commit the crime."
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(e) making improper use of flag of truce, of the
flag or of the military insignia and uniform of
the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as
of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions, resulting in death or serious
personal injury;

cf. Art. 23

[(f) the transfer by the Occupying Power of
parts of its own civilian population into the
territory it occupies;]

Art. 49
subpara. 6 GC
IV; Art. 85
para. 4 (a)
Add. Prot. I

B 2. (a)

(g) intentionally directing attacks against
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or
charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not
being used at the time for military purposes;

cf. Art. 27

B 2. (d)

(h) subjecting persons who are in the power of
an adverse Party to physical mutilation or to
medical or scientific experiments of any kind
which are neither justified by the medical,
dental or hospital treatment of the person
concerned nor carried out in his interest, and
which causes death to or seriously endangers
the health of such person or persons;

cf. Art. 11
para. 1 and 4
Add. Prot. I

B 3.

(i) killing or wounding treacherously
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or
army;

Art. 23 para.
1 (b) Hague
IV

B 4. (a)

(j) declaring that no quarter will be given;

Art. 23 para.
I (d) Hague

B 4. (c)

para. 1 (f)
Hague IV

B 4. (d);
cf also
B 1. (*)

Hague IV

IV
(k) destroying or seizing the enemy's property
unless such destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of
war;

Art. 23 para.
1 (g) Hague
IV

B 4. (e)

(1) declaring abolished, suspended or
inadmissable in a court of law the rights and
actions of the nationals of the hostile party;

Art. 23 para.
1 (h) Hague
IV

B 4. (f)
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(m) compelling the nationals of the hostile
party to take part in the operations of war
directed against their own country, even if they
were in the belligerent's service before the
commencement of the war;

Art. 23 para 2
Hague IV

B 4. (g)

(n) pillaging a town or place, even when taken
by assault;

Art. 28 Hague
IV

B 4. (i)

(o) employing the following weapons,
projectiles and material and methods of
warfare which are calculated to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering;

cf. Art. 35
para. 2 Add.
Prot. I

B 4. (k)

(i) poison or poisoned weapons;

Art. 23 para.
1 (a) Hague
IV

B 4. (j)

(ii) asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and
all analogous liquids, materials or devices,

Geneva
Protocol 1925

B 4. (k)
(i)

(iii) bullets which expand or flatten easily in
the human body, such as bullets with a hard
envelope which does not entirely cover the core
or is pierced with incisions,

Declaration of
1899

B 4. (k)
(ii)

(iv) bacteriological (biological) agents or toxins
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict,

Conv. On
Biological
Weapons 1972

B 4. (k)
(iii)

(v) chemical weapons as defined in and
prohibited by the 1993 Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
On Their Destruction;

Conv. On
Chemical
Weapons

B 4. (k)
(iv)

(p) [committing] outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, including rape, enforced
prostitution and other sexual violence of
comparable gravity;

Art. 76 para.
1 Add. Prot. I;
Art. 77 para.
1 Add. Prot. I

B 4. (n)

(q) utilizing the presence of a civilian or other
protected person to render certain points,
areas, or military forces immune from military
operations;

Art. 51 para.
7 Add. Prot. I

B 4. (o)
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(r) intentionally directing attacks against
buildings, material, medical units and
transport, and personnel using, in conformity
with international law, the distinctive emblems
of the Geneva Conventions;

[Vol. 8:199
B 4. (q)

(s)intentionally using starvation of civilians as
a method of warfare by depriving them of
objects indispensable to their survival,
including wilfully impeding relief supplies as
provided for under the Geneva Conventions;

cf. Art. 54
para. 1 and 2
Add. Prot. I;
cf. also Art. 23
GC IV

B 4. (r)

[(t) [forcing] [recruiting] children under the age
of fifteen years to take direct part in
hostilities;]

Art. 77 para.
2 Add. Prot. I;
Art. 38 Conv.
Rights of
Child

B 4. (s)

Sections C and D of this Article apply to armed
conflicts not of an international character and
thus do not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other
acts of a similar nature.

Cf. Art. 1
para. 2 Add.
Prot. II

[C. Serious violations of Article 3 common to
the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 in the case of an armed conflict not of an
international character namely any of the
following acts committed against persons
taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any
other cause:

C

(a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;

Art. 3 para. 1
sent. 1 (a) GC
I-IV

C 1. (a)

(b) [committing] outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating abd
degrading treatment [including rape, enforced
prostitution and other sexual violence of
comparable gravity];

Art. 3 para. 1
sent. 1 (c) GC
I-IV; [cf. Also
Art. 4 para 2
(e) Add. Prot.
II]

C 1. (c)
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(c) taking of hostages;

Art. 3 para. 1
sent. 1 (b) GC
I-IV

C 1. (b)

(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying
out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all judicial guarantees which are
generally recognized as indispensable.]

Art. 3 para. 1
sent. 1 (d)

C 1. (d)

[D. Other serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an
international character, within the established
framework of international law, namely any of
the following acts:
(a) intentionally directing attacks against the
civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities; 156

0 2.

Art. 13 para.
2 sent. 1 and
para. 3 Add.
Prot. II

(b) intentionally directing attacks against
buildings, material, medical units and
transports, and personnel using, in conformity
with international law, the distinctive emblems
of the Geneva Conventions;

C 2. (i)

C 2. (m)

(c) intentionally directing attacks against
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or
charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not
being used at the time for military purposes;

cf. Art. 27
Hague IV

C 2. (n)

(d) pillaging a town or place, even when taken
by assault;

cf. Art. 28
Hague IV

C 2. (h)

(e) [committing] outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, including rape, enforced
prostitution and other sexual violence of
comparable gravity;

cf. Art. 4 para.
2 (e) Add.
Prot. II

C 1. (c)

156. The view was expressed that attacks against civilian objects should be considered in this
context (cf. 12).
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[(f) [forcing] [recruiting] children under the age
of fifteen years to take direct part in
hostilities;]

cf. Art. 4 para.
3 (c) Add.
Prot. II; Art.
38 Rights of
the Child
Conv.

C 2. (p)

(g) ordering the displacement of the civilian
population for reasons related to the conduct,
unless the security of the civilians involved or
military reasons so demand;

Art. 17 para.
1 Add. Prot. II

C 2. (q)

(h) killing or wounding treacherously a
combatant adversary;

cf. Art. 23
para. 1 (b)
Hague IV

C 2. (r)

(i) declaring that no quarter will be given;

cf. Art. 23
para. 1 (d)
Hague IV

C 2. (s)

(j) subjecting persons who are in the power of
another Party to the conflict to physical
mutilation or to medical or scientific
experiments of any kind which are neither
justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the person concerned nor carried
out in his interest, and which cause death to or
seriously endanger the health of such person or
persons;

cf. Art. 5 para.
2 (e) Add.
Prot. II

new

(k) destroying or seizing the property of an
adversary unless such destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of
the conflict.]

cf. Art. 23
para. 1 (g)
Hague IV

new

[Elsewhere in the Statute:
The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to
the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole. The Court
shall have jurisdiction in respect of the crimes
listed in Article X [war crimes] only when
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part
of a large-scale commission of such crimes.] 5 7

chapeau
before A

157. The view was expressed that the substance and placement of this proposal should be
considered.
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Appendix VI
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/9 (1998) [ICC Statute].

Article 8
War Crimes
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular
when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes.
2.

For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely, any of the following acts against persons or property
protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(i)

Wilful killing;

(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly;
(v)

Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve
in the forces of a hostile Power;

(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of
the rights of fair and regular trial;
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
(viii) Taking of hostages.
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within the established framework of
international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is,
objects which are not military objectives;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations,
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance
or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the
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United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of
armed conflict;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated;
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages,
dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not
military objectives;
(vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms
or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at
discretion;
(vii) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the
military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United
Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury;
(viii)The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of
parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies,
or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of
the occupied territory within or outside this territory;
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded
are collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(x) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to
physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any
kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or
hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his
or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger
the health of such person or persons;
(xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the
hostile nation or army;
(xii) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war;
(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law
the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party;
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(xv) Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the
operations of war directed against their own country, even if
they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement
of the war;
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;
(xviii)Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or devices;
(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human
body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not
entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions;
(xx)

Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of
warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in
violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided
that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of
warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are
included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment in
accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in articles 121
and 123;

(xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in
humiliating and degrading treatment;

particular

(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also
constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions;
(xxiii)Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to
render certain points, areas or military forces immune from
military operations;
(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material,
medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with
international law;
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their
survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided
for under the Geneva Conventions;
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years
into the national armed forces or using them to participate
actively in hostilities.
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(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character,
serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed
against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other
cause:
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(ii) Taking of hostages;
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally
recognized as indispensable.
(d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international
character and thus does not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence or other acts of a similar nature.
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflicts not of an international character, within the established
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material,
medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with
international law;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations,
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance
or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection
given to civilians or civilian objects under the law of armed
conflict;
(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(v) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
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(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also
constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions;
(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years
into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively
in hostilities;
(viii)Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons
related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians
involved or imperative military reasons so demand;
(ix) Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;
(x)

Declaring that no quarter will be given;

(xi) Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the
conflict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific
experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the
medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned
nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or
seriously endanger the health of such person or persons;
(xii) Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of the conflict;
(f) Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international
character and thus does not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts
that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups.
3.

Nothing in paragraphs 2 (c) and (d) shall affect the responsibility of a
Government to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to
defend the unity and territorial integrity of the State, by all legitimate
means.

